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Crisis and Risk Communication Scholarship 
of the Future: Reflections on Research Gaps 
Brooke Fisher Liu1     and Jeannette Viens1  
1. Department of Communication, University of Maryland College Park, College Park,  
Maryland, USA
ABSTRACT
Risk and crisis communication is a vibrant and growing area of research and practice. 
As we head into the third year of publishing the first journal dedicated to crisis and 
risk communication, the editor and editorial assistant pose some especially promising 
areas for future research. In this essay, we also introduce the articles published in this 
journal, including how they meet promising research gaps to fill.
KEYWORDS: risk, crisis, communication, research gaps
Risk and crisis communication is a vibrant and growing area of 
research and practice. As we head into the third year of publish-
ing the first journal dedicated to crisis and risk communication, 
we pose some especially promising areas for future research. The 
journal continues to accept all research related to risk and cri-
sis communication, but we should think about how we can best 
advance theory and practice through generating valuable, new 
knowledge. As noted in the last editorial essay, reviewers for this 
journal often criticize manuscripts for not advancing new knowl-
edge (Liu & Stanley, 2019). The purpose of this essay is to start a 
conversation about promising future research directions, rather 
than generate a definitive list of research gaps. As you read, con-
sider what you think the future of risk and crisis communication 
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scholarship should be and submit that work to the Journal. We 
conclude the essay with introducing the articles in this issue of the 
Journal.
More Public-Driven Research
We first pose that we need more public-driven risk and crisis com-
munication research. From situational crisis communication the-
ory (Coombs, 2019) to image repair discourse (Benoit, 2018) to 
typologies (Coombs, 2010; Lerbinger, 1997; Seeger et al., 2003), 
crisis and risk communication research has advanced in a manner 
that prioritized understanding how organizations should man-
age adverse events. The scholarship that emerged, while promi-
nent and important, created an imbalance in understanding more 
about how organizations manage crises instead of how members 
of the public or communities manage crises. 
Crises exist beyond the realm of corporations, governments, 
and nonprofits, affecting real people, properties, and livelihoods. 
Risks are integral to community members’ daily routines with 
continued gun violence and climate change disasters, among other 
risks. Scholars should extend their research beyond issues of rep-
utation and repair, and find solutions for publics (Liu & Fraustino, 
2014). The field needs stakeholder perspectives, not just descrip-
tions of the nature of crisis responses. By shifting to a public-driven 
approach, a plethora of significant questions emerge for the dis-
cipline to consider. For example, research has highly emphasized 
cognitive variables and responses. Therefore, poignantly, the role 
of emotion and affect in crisis and risk communication needs fur-
ther exploration and confirmation (c.f., Jin et al., 2012). What is 
the relationship among emotions, risk perception, and, further-
more, the important information-seeking and protective-actions 
that the discipline strives to identify? As another example ques-
tion for future research, how do publics communicate about cri-
ses independent of organizations? How does this public-to-public 
communication affect outcomes like protective-action taking?
Interpersonal Risk and Crisis Communication
The field additionally needs to supplement intrapersonal com-
munication knowledge with a more robust understanding of 
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interpersonal communication in the case of risks and crises. 
Understanding who communicates to who, when, and with what 
messages has important implications. When it comes to risks and 
crises, communication is not limited to organization-to-public, 
but also includes public-to-public, as noted above. There is a need 
to understand what is being transmitted beyond the formal chan-
nels, at what frequency, and to what extent. This may be especially 
prominent in the era of social media where the plethora of online 
platforms and personas have an influential stake in the communi-
cation of (mis)information. 
Current Challenges
A third notable research gap is scholarship that addresses current 
risk and crisis communication challenges. At the inaugural meet-
ing of our editorial board in March 2019, members noted that it 
is important to publish research that advances practice, and not 
just theory. We have already published research in this journal on 
some of the most noteworthy risks and crises of our time, includ-
ing the refugee crisis in Europe (Johansson, 2018), the Ebola pan-
demic (Dillard & Yang, 2019; Sellnow-Richmond et al., 2018), 
sexual misconduct on college campuses (Woods & Veil, 2020), and 
the Fukashima Daiichi nuclear disaster (Kwesell & Jung, 2019). 
We call for more research on such contemporary crises, advancing 
theory and practice for 21st century risk and crisis communica-
tion challenges. 
Inclusive Scholarship
Shifting to a public-driven perspective emphasizes the impor-
tant question of who is being included versus excluded in studies. 
Crises affect publics differently, especially publics who already are 
vulnerable. Waymer and Heath (2007) explored this distinction in 
relation to Hurricane Katrina, but it must be an essential consider-
ation for additional crisis and risk communication research. How 
are warning systems being used, updated, or critiqued on behalf 
of disabled communities or language learners? How are protec-
tive actions being communicated to immigrants and refugees? 
What do these communities witness, experience, and need when 
it comes to crises and risks? Ultimately, there is a promising need 
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for crisis and risk communication theories to be more encompass-
ing and inclusive.
As scholarship considers a diversity of publics who face a vari-
ety of crises, the role of culture also becomes more prominent. 
Intercultural communication is a vital part of understanding 
crisis communication. Further developing the field may include 
using culture as a variable in new and established models as well 
as conducting cross-cultural studies. Diers-Lawson (2017) called 
for scholars to broaden the voices heard in crisis research, to con-
textualize American research, and to promote more meaning-
ful cross-cultural work. Crisis and risk communication research 
needs to expand its horizons with a more global perspective that 
better recognizes the work, theories, and differences around the 
world. Such work includes crises that span boundaries, including 
public health outbreaks.
Multiphase Scholarship 
We also pose that research needs to expand its timeline focus as 
the discipline continues to develop. Crises do not occur as isolated 
incidents in a vacuum, soon to be forgotten by those whoexperi-
enced them. Risk perception is not always the result of carefully 
considered logic specific to each unique situation. These events 
are not necessarily linear, so there is a gap in understanding as 
to how crises proceed and take shape. In turn, future scholarship 
can highlight various phases, whether the preparation or recovery 
stage, and contribute to a stronger understanding of the nature 
of crises. How do our existing theories work in different stages 
of a crisis? Along those lines, scholarship needs to include the 
long-term impact of crises and further explore the influence of 
repeated instances. How do memory and recall of a crisis affect 
communication, especially surrounding protective actions, in 
other events? How are publics influenced in the case of frequent 
repeated instances, such as areas with monsoon, hurricane, or tor-
nado seasons? 
The Current Issue
With these promising research gaps in mind, we now introduce 
the current issue of the Journal. All five articles advance one of the 
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research gaps noted above: advancing 21st century risk and crisis 
communication challenges. First, Andrade et al. (2020) offer one 
of the first published articles on the government’s failed response 
to Hurricane María in Puerto Rico, focusing on the understud-
ied area of rumor generation. Brown-Devlin and Brown (2020) 
extend theory to understand how to manage sports-related crises, 
an understudied area that frequently challenges sports organiza-
tions and their multiple publics. Brunson et al. (2020) introduce 
a futuristic scenario to facilitate medical countermeasure com-
munication. By taking on a contemporary crisis communication 
challenge, this article illustrates how research-based simulations 
can advance practice. Woods and Veil (2020) examine a legal 
public relations case study related to sexual misconduct, thereby 
providing novel insights about one of the enduring risk and crisis 
communication challenges of our time. We hope that you enjoy 
reading the articles in this issue, and that they inspire you to sub-
mit your own research to the Journal. 
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ABSTRACT
This study assessed the Government of Puerto Rico’s crisis and emergency risk com-
munications following Hurricane Maria and the post-disaster information environ-
ment to identify factors that may have contributed to negative public perceptions of 
mortality reports. Data included Government of Puerto Rico press releases, press con-
ference audio recordings and Facebook Live transmissions, digital media news and 
social media commentary, and interviews with Government of Puerto Rico personnel 
and community stakeholders. Study findings indicate that inadequate crisis commu-
nication planning and training, coupled with information gaps and inconsistencies, 
contributed to rumors around the issue of mortality. As a consequence, the Govern-
ment of Puerto Rico lost the ability to effectively manage messaging, thus decreasing 
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their credibility, perceived transparency, and public trust. Recommendations regarding 
future preparedness activities and research are offered. 
KEYWORDS: crisis communication, disasters, mortality, rumor generation
Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico on September 
20, 2017, as a Category 4 storm, causing widespread devastation 
and becoming the costliest tropical cyclone in Puerto Rican his-
tory (Scott, 2018). Numerous challenges to disaster response and 
recovery were exacerbated by multiple cascading failures in crit-
ical infrastructure and key resource sectors. Maria left millions 
of residents without electricity for weeks to months, and entire 
communities were isolated due to disrupted telecommunications, 
blocked roadways, and flooding (Federal Emergency Management 
Administration [FEMA], 2018). In this context, Government of 
Puerto Rico officials experienced difficulty providing timely and 
accurate information about hurricane-related deaths. Soon after 
the hurricane, the official death toll was widely questioned given 
the storm’s severity, anecdotal evidence, and studies by outside 
groups estimating mortality of up to 72 times the official count of 
64 deaths (Acosta & Irizarry, 2018; Kishore et al., 2018; Pascual 
Sosa, 2017; Rivera & Rolke, 2019; Robles et al., 2017; Santos-
Lozada & Howard, 2018). As evidence for a higher death toll 
mounted, so did the public’s request for this issue to be addressed.
The George Washington University Milken Institute School of 
Public Health (GW SPH) was commissioned by the Government 
of Puerto Rico to conduct an independent study that included: 
(1) an epidemiological assessment of excess mortality; (2) a pro-
cess evaluation of disaster context death certification; and (3) an 
assessment of the Government of Puerto Rico’s crisis and emer-
gency risk communication (CERC), with an emphasis on mortal-
ity reporting to the public. Here, we discuss the third component, 
with an overarching goal of identifying factors that may have con-
tributed to controversy surrounding the death toll. To this end, we 
assessed the application of CERC guidelines by the Puerto Rican 
Government, in particular for public communication about mor-
tality; examined the information environment in which mortality 
was conveyed; and explored Puerto Rican stakeholder perceptions 
regarding these communications. 
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Literature Review
Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication
Communication with the public is a critical component of effective 
disaster preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery (Centers 
for Disease Control [CDC], 2014; World Health Organization 
[WHO], 2005). Effective communication in disasters requires 
extensive planning and active management, and includes elements 
to establish public trust through information source credibility 
and transparency (Covello, 2003; Reynolds, 2006, 2011; Seeger, 
2006; Steelman & McCaffrey, 2013; S. Veil et al., 2008). Effective 
Media Communication during Public Health Emergencies lays out 
six recommended steps for effective media communication, and 
includes capacity assessment tools, such as the Internal Media 
Relations Assessment Tool and an Effective Media Communication 
Plan checklist (WHO, 2005). Further, there are guidelines in 
the Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) manual 
(CDC, 2014), which outline principles of risk communication in 
crisis, and details other considerations, such as planning and the 
communication lifecycle; crisis stages; audiences, messages, and 
channels; spokespersons; human resources; and working with the 
media. However, the experiences of Hurricane Maria underscored 
the limitations of these guidelines when communicating about 
mortality after a catastrophic natural disaster. 
Information Vacuums and Public Perception in Disasters
Regardless of established best practices and guidelines for com-
munication, disasters present unique challenges given their inher-
ent uncertainty, particularly in the case of catastrophic natural 
disasters (Seeger et al., 2018; Tinker & Vaughan, 2010). In rapidly 
evolving disaster contexts, facts can be elusive. Communicators 
must have the capacity to adapt, especially when faced with lim-
ited availability of credible information, or an unmet “informa-
tion sufficiency threshold” (Griffin et al., 2009; Seeger et al., 2018, 
p. 197). In disasters, these information vacuums create opportu-
nities for the public to speculate, make inferences to explain gaps, 
question motives, generate rumors, or propagate unverified/false 
information, in an attempt to reconcile perceived incongruences 
(Hagar, 2013). 
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In the absence of sufficient information, people tend to rely 
on their perceptions (Reynolds, 2011; Seeger, 2006; Seeger 
et al., 2018), as well as information sources they already trust and 
familiar channels (Savoia et al., 2013; Wray et al., 2008). Given the 
importance of public perception in disasters and the potential risks 
introduced by information vacuums, CERC planning and delivery 
should incorporate mitigation of any gaps between public percep-
tions and facts (Peters et al., 1997; Pornpitakpan, 2004; Ruggiero & 
Vos, 2015). Nevertheless, while CERC guidelines address the cor-
rection of misinformation and misperceptions in the media, they 
do not adequately address how information vacuums, a phenome-
non that is likely to occur following catastrophic events, should be 
handled by communicators after disasters. 
Navigating the Disaster Information Environment 
Inevitably, disaster communication exists within a larger disaster 
information environment, compelling communicators to monitor 
and interact with this environment (Savoia et al., 2017). An increas-
ing number of studies highlight the impact that news media can 
have on public perceptions and behaviors in crises (Eckert et al., 
2018; Parmer et al., 2016; Westerman et. al., 2014), demonstrating 
its potential to be leveraged for its broad public reach and familiar-
ity (Littlefield & Quenette, 2007; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). Social 
media networks have, in many cases, eclipsed traditional mass 
media as critical disaster information sources. As a rapid, two-way 
channel, social media has the potential to create disaster response 
transparency, enhance situational awareness, facilitate aid deliv-
ery, and crowd-verify or eliminate rumors (Hughes & Palen, 2012; 
Yates & Paquette, 2011). At the same time, not all disaster response 
agencies have established capacities to monitor public reactions 
and engage with stakeholders in real time through social media 
platforms. Consequently, these information-sharing networks can 
produce unprecedented challenges, such as the rapid propagation 
of misinformation, contributing to an information environment 
that can swiftly spin out of control (Liu et al., 2014). In these cases, 
organizations leading disaster response risk losing their ability 
to manage crisis messaging, potentially compromising response 
efforts (Reynolds, 2011; Seeger, 2006). 
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Communication of Disaster Mortality to the Public 
A key issue of public interest following disasters is mortality, espe-
cially since it is crucial to informing response and recovery efforts, 
policymaking, providing insight into population health status, and 
creating a broader understanding of the disaster’s magnitude and 
impact (Checchi & Roberts, 2005; Rickard et al., 2013; Salama 
et al., 2004; Santos-Burgoa et al., 2018). Notably, mortality also 
has the potential to become highly politicized following disasters 
(Checchi & Roberts, 2008). Despite the importance of communi-
cating to the public about disaster mortality, there is a scarcity of 
research in this area, and currently no consensus, on best practices 
for disaster mortality communication—it is here where the expe-
riences of Hurricane Maria offer important lessons. 
While disaster psychology and risk communication are estab-
lished fields, efforts in the scientific and emergency management 
communities to systematically examine how the public processes 
and interprets disaster death counts or estimates are minimal. It is 
reasonable to think that lay audiences and media outlets may expe-
rience difficulty understanding methods used to determine disas-
ter mortality (Lagassé et al., 2011; Reynolds, 2011; Seeger et al., 
2003), which can be statistically complex and vary from one study 
to another. Nevertheless, these methods influence how mortality 
estimates can be interpreted given the assumptions and limitations 
of each approach (Hammer, 2018; Sandberg et al., 2019). This very 
scenario unfolded following Hurricane Maria, when the informa-
tion environment became saturated with media coverage compar-
ing the official death toll to numerous unofficial estimates, all using 
distinct methods, time periods, and populations at risk to produce 
mortality estimates (Sandberg et al., 2019). Yet, these death figures 
were compared without considering these important differences.
Following Hurricane Maria, journalists and the general public 
demanded that every lost life be counted, viewing this method as 
the most valid method of truly knowing how many died (Chec-
chi & Roberts, 2008). While it is appropriate to mourn every lost 
life following such a tragedy, this information can be difficult to 
obtain and verify in the immediate post-disaster period. This 
expectation of having timely and accurate hurricane-related death 
counts immediately following a catastrophic disaster represents a 
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failure among scientists and communicators to convey the inher-
ent superiority of excess mortality estimation over “body counts” 
in complex disaster scenarios where surveillance systems and 
death certification processes are disrupted (Checchi & Roberts, 
2008). Currently, there is little to guide communicators in making 
this distinction apparent to public audiences; while there is scien-
tific literature related to mortality surveillance (Choudhary, 2012; 
Farag et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2017; Rocha et al., 2017; Seil et al., 
2016) and documenting cause of death (Centre for Research on 
the Epidemiology of Disasters [CRED], 2016; Lakkireddy et al., 
2004; Phillips et al., 2014; Wexelman et al., 2013), there is a paucity 
of studies exploring the specific concept of communicating disas-
ter mortality to the public. There is no literature base that exam-
ines how death counts from a disaster should be communicated to 
the media, how to best explain information gaps that are common 
following disasters, how death counts may evolve post-disaster, or 
how to explain the science behind excess death estimates and what 
we can or cannot infer from these estimates. This research gap 
increases the likelihood that efforts in this area of communication 
will continue to be fraught with challenges if not addressed.
Methods
To understand factors that may have contributed to the death 
toll controversy, we used a multisource post-disaster CERC rapid 
assessment protocol to examine Government of Puerto Rico com-
munications and spokesperson media interactions, how these 
interactions influenced the evolution of media coverage, and 
stakeholder perceptions of mortality reports. CERC and WHO 
guidelines informed the analytical framework described below 
(CDC, 2014; WHO, 2005). 
Data Collection and Analysis
We collected data from five sources. We systematically reviewed 
17 Government of Puerto Rico press releases and 20 press confer-
ences (10 Facebook Live transmissions, 10 audio recordings) for 
the study period, September 20, 2017–February 28, 2018, to iden-
tify key messages and spokesperson delivery of mortality informa-
tion (see Table 1). 
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TABLE 1 Press Releases and Press Conferences
Data 
Source
Analytical Framework Source 
Assessment Criteria
Pr
es
s 
Re
le
as
es
  
(n
=2
0)
WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health  
Emergencies handbook: 
https://www.who.int/csr/resources/ 
publications/WHO_CDS_2005_31/en/
Press Release Content Included:
(1) Key messages to the public; (2) Actions currently being taken; 
(3) Actions that will be taken next; (4) How the public can help;  
(5) Where to look for more information
CDC CERC manual guidelines: https://emergency.cdc.gov/cerc/
manual/index.asp adapted criteria, 9 Elements for Establishing  
Trust and Credibility through Communications, p. 158; adapted  
criteria, Spokesperson Pitfalls During an Emergency, p. 160  
WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health  
Emergencies handbook, Steps of Communication in Crisis
 P
re
ss
 C
on
fe
re
nc
es
 
 (n
=1
7)
Content and Spokesperson Delivery included:
1. Expression of empathy (trust)
[Demonstrates empathy, caring, commitment—verbally and 
in body language] 
•  When responding to a question or comment about loss of 
any kind (death/injury) first expressed compassion, empathy, 
caring? 
• Acknowledged the validity of people’s emotions?
2. Clarifying facts/call for action (credibility)
  [What you know—in clear, key messages; Information is 
accessible to all educational levels; Avoid professional jargon; 
Information source expertise (education, role); Accuracy: 
Accurate facts that have been confirmed; Consistency:  
Consistent information] 
•  Delivered information in a clear manner? 
•  Used language appropriate for target audiences? 
•  Avoided the use of undefined jargon, acronyms and technical 
language? 
•  Provided supporting facts for key messages? 
•  Used numbers, statistics and data effectively? 
•  Acted in partnership with credible third parties? 
•  Avoided going beyond the bounds of expertise? 
•  Made corrections quickly if errors were made? 
•  Provided consistent, coordinated information?
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Pr
es
s 
Co
nf
er
en
ce
s
(n
=1
7)
3. What is not known (trust/transparency)
  [Acknowledgement of Uncertainty: What you don’t know—in 
clear key messages; Explain why information isn’t available 
for release] 
 •  Acknowledged uncertainty? 
 •  Discussed data and information uncertainties, strengths and 
weaknesses—including those identified by other credible 
sources? 
 •  Clarified unknown information in a way that established trans-
parency (“I don’t know” instead of “I cannot answer that”)? 
 •  Avoided guessing/speculating? 
 •  Provided a valid reason for not answering the question?
4. Process to obtain answers (trust/transparency)
  [What process you are using to get answers: explain steps/
required information] 
  •  Described the process required to obtain requested  
information? 
  •  Explained what processes you are waiting for, circumstances 
contributing to delays?
  •  Supported and reinforced your message with visual aids such 
as timelines or flowcharts?
5. Statements of commitment (accountability) 
  •  Stated commitment to acquiring and providing additional 
information as soon as possible?
6. Information referrals/scheduled updates (transparency) 
  •  Provided guidance on where to obtain additional information 
that expanded on key messages?
We conducted qualitative content analysis of press releases 
based on the extent to which they included information on hur-
ricane mortality in five areas (Maxwell, 2009) (see Table 1): inclu-
sion of mortality as a key message (and consistency of provided 
details); what was being done to assess mortality; what will be 
done to assess mortality; actions the public could take to assist; 
and where to look for more information. We also reviewed press 
conference proceedings based on criteria drawn from WHO and 
CDC guidelines (see Table 1). We assessed spokesperson delivery 
and content to determine the extent to which these criteria were 
met, thus contributing to the conceptual domains of trust, credi-
bility, transparency, and accountability. For example, if spokesper-
sons fail to describe steps being taken to determine mortality and 
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provide vague responses about information they have about the 
death count, this may compromise perceptions of trust and trans-
parency among public audiences.
To assess potential information environment influence on 
stakeholder perceptions of Government of Puerto Rico mortality 
reports, we systematically collected and reviewed 172 English- and 
Spanish-language digital media news reports and related social 
media commentary. We collected primary sources of information 
or stories from major U.S. mainland and Puerto Rican news out-
lets (e.g., CNN, Washington Post, New York Times, El Nuevo Día, 
LatinoUSA, among others). News articles (n=53) and social media 
posts were identified through web-based search engines (Google, 
Yahoo) and social media platforms (YouTube, n=36; Facebook, 
n=37; and Twitter, n=46) by systematically searching for predeter-
mined keywords and hashtags (see Table 2). 
TABLE 2 Digital Media News Reports & Social Media Commentary
Data 
Source
Analytical Framework Source
Assessment Criteria
D
ig
it
al
 M
ed
ia
 N
ew
s 
Re
po
rt
s 
&
 S
oc
ia
l  
M
ed
ia
 C
om
m
en
ta
ry
 (n
=1
72
)
CDC CERC manual guidelines, Working with Social Media Before 
& During a Crisis, p. 268
WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health Emer-
gencies handbook
(1) Reasons and timing of mortality reports; (2) Appropriate 
use of statistics; (3) Contradictory mortality data from official 
spokespeople and unofficial sources; (4) Information used to 
classify death as hurricane-related; (5) Explanations and illustra-
tions given for complex topics/processes; (6) Information gaps 
filled by unofficial information; (7) Perceptions of the accuracy 
and transparency of Government of Puerto Rico messages 
regarding death figures
Keywords/Phrases: Death toll Hurricane Maria; Deaths Hurricane 
Maria Puerto Rico; Rosello death toll; Controversy death toll 
Hurricane Maria; Deaths Hurricane Maria Puerto Rico; Muertos 
Huracan Maria; Muertes Maria Puerto Rico
Hashtags: #PuertoRico #HurricaneMaria #puertoricohurricane 
Maria #PuertoRicoRelief #PuertoRicoDeathToll #Hurricane 
MariaDeathToll #HurricaneMariaDeaths 
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Digital media data collection captured mortality information des-
tined for the public as it was introduced or changed to understand 
the chronology and information sharing dynamics. We conducted 
qualitative content analysis of digital media news and social media 
commentary to identify content in seven areas, related to domains 
of trust, credibility, transparency, and accountability (Maxwell, 
2009) (see Table 2). For example, if in response to a news article 
suggesting that the official death toll was an undercount, the pre-
dominant commentary expressed the perception that the Puerto 
Rican Government was hiding information that would discredit 
their disaster response, we assessed that line of commentary to 
express perceptions of (non-) transparency and a lack of account-
ability. 
Interviews were also conducted with 33 key informants, includ-
ing 11 Puerto Rican Government personnel and 22 leaders rep-
resenting stakeholder groups, during a 2-week period in April of 
2018. Interviews helped characterize actions and events related to 
preparation and dissemination of mortality data, as well as stake-
holder perceptions of the Government’s mortality communi-
cations. Government personnel participants held key positions 
TABLE 3 In-Depth Interviews
Data 
Source
Analytical Framework Source
Assessment Criteria
Co
m
m
un
it
y 
 
St
ak
eh
ol
de
r  
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
(n
=2
2) CDC CERC manual guidelines, Stakeholder and Partner  
Communication, p. 241
WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health Emer-
gencies handbook
Qualitative thematic analysis, Perceptions of mortality reports—
in the domains of trust, transparency, accountability, credibility 
(subdomains: expertise, accuracy, consistency)
G
ov
er
nm
en
t  
Pe
rs
on
ne
l  
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
(n
=1
1) CDC CERC manual guidelines, 9-step crisis communication plan and 
process, p. 98; Working with Social Media Before and During a Crisis, 
p. 268
WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health  
Emergencies handbook
Qualitative thematic analysis, Accounts of mortality reporting 
communication processes
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including heads of agencies or departments and communication 
leadership or staff. Community stakeholder participants included 
municipal mayors, community leaders, emergency responders, 
police, faith leaders, health care providers, non-profit organi-
zation staff, and funeral home directors, which were selected to 
represent all regions of Puerto Rico and exemplify a range of expe-
riences given municipal diversity in socioeconomic status, polit-
ical affiliation, demographics, and proximity to hospitals/clinics. 
We conducted interviews that lasted approximately 1 hour using 
a semi-structured protocol in Spanish. Interviews were audio- 
recorded and transcribed. Participants provided informed consent 
and protocols were IRB-approved. Shown in Table 3, we deductively 
and inductively coded transcripts using a procedure similar to the 
qualitative content analysis described above, and analyzed coded text 
to identify major themes representing participant response patterns. 
Coding was accomplished using NVivo version 11 software. As such, 
common and unique views and experiences among stakeholder and 
government personnel participants were elucidated (Bernard, 2005; 
Maxwell, 2009).
Results
Results are presented below, and organized into the following 
thematic areas: (1) CERC planning and coordination under-
taken by the Government of Puerto Rico; (2) handling of mor-
tality information gaps by the Government of Puerto Rico; (3) 
unofficial mortality reports in the information environment; and 
(4) Government of Puerto Rico CERC capacity, including spokes-
person performance. Perceptions of Puerto Rico stakeholders are 
discussed throughout.
CERC Planning and Coordination
According to Government of Puerto Rico personnel participants, 
a number of factors created difficult circumstances for the teams 
responsible for CERC, mortality surveillance, and communication 
of mortality to the public. These circumstances stemmed from the 
devastation caused by Hurricane Maria, and also because a foun-
dation for effective disaster communication was not in place. The 
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Government of Puerto Rico did not have formal, written CERC 
plans at the time of the hurricane. As noted in our interviews:
. . . there was nothing [for CERC plans]. We were preparing—we 
had a couple of months saying this is what we need, these are the 
work groups. We had everything set up, and then boom [the hurri-
cane hit].—Government of Puerto Rico Agency Leadership
Was there a written emergency communication plan before the  
hurricane? Not that I was aware of.—Government of Puerto Rico 
Agency Communication Leadership
According to agency leadership, Puerto Rico’s emergency plan, 
and municipal emergency plans, was appropriate for a Category 1 
hurricane, but not a catastrophic event. According to one member 
of the Government of Puerto Rico Agency Leadership:
. . . the plans in Puerto Rico were not prepared for a Category 5 
hurricane. The plans in Puerto Rico are prepared for a Category 1 
hurricane, which is really what we are used to having in Puerto Rico. 
So, now they have learned that the plan created many difficulties 
because neither the people were prepared for this [hurricane], nor 
the agencies either. 
As a result, emergency plans did not include scenarios such 
as multiple cascading failures in critical infrastructure and key 
resource sectors, as specified in the Department of Homeland 
Security’s National Planning Scenario (NPS) #10, “Category 3 or 
Higher Hurricane.” Mass media channels were largely unavailable, 
and Government personnel had not strategically planned to use 
alternative channels, such as radio or interpersonal communica-
tion, to coordinate public health or disaster response efforts. As 
various participants in our interviews noted:
We were almost completely incomunicado. There was only one  
radio station.—Community Leader
There was one [radio] station that worked during the hurricane . . .  
it was the only media that there was, no cellular, no television, no 
electricity, and in terms of health information, on that station it was 
very general.—Non-profit Organization Personnel
. . . let’s talk about leptospirosis. Well, I presented this issue direct-
ly to the Department of Health. There was no response to prevent  
cases. That never occurred. —Municipal Mayor
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Finally, communication contingencies that were implemented 
were inconsistent or ineffective. As one Municipal Mayor noted: 
Communications? Bad . . . satellite phones didn’t work at all. I even 
remember when the personnel came to our municipality to demon-
strate how the satellite phone worked, and they said to me, “Mayor, 
there’s no way. What you will have to do is use it after midnight.” 
And I said, “What do I need it for after midnight?” I think that for 
almost all of the mayors the satellite phone didn’t work.
The lack of communication capabilities post-hurricane 
detracted from community members’ perceived credibility of 
preparedness and response efforts. According to one community 
leader:
For me it was surprising to see people from emergency manage-
ment that didn’t have radio communication. I could not believe 
that in the middle of a hurricane, the most important people in  
Puerto Rico for managing disasters weren’t prepared. So, the worst 
part of everything was the question of preparedness . . . really, for us 
it showed complete ineptitude in this day and age . . .
These factors related to planning and infrastructure collapse 
limited the Puerto Rican Government’s ability to coordinate with 
municipalities and provide timely, reliable mortality information 
to the public. On one hand, Government personnel who were 
operating from the Center for Operations in Emergencies (COE) 
described a highly centralized process for preparing information 
destined for the public. This was reflected, for example, in the con-
sistency between death counts given by spokespersons and press 
releases. However, communication personnel also noted chal-
lenges and delays in coordinating mortality data with municipali-
ties, again related to infrastructure collapse and inadequate plans 
for effective contingencies. According to a member of the Govern-
ment of Puerto Rico Agency Communication Leadership:
The problem with communication between municipalities and the 
central government was that there was no way to communicate effi-
ciently. At first, the governor had [someone] going to all the munici-
palities each day to communicate. A lot of information was delayed. 
We were at the COE 24 hours and communication among us was 
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continual. But, information wasn’t flowing from municipalities. 
There should have been a designated liaison at each municipality 
to communicate with the central government instead of one person 
trying to reach all 78 municipalities. 
Further complicating the communication of hurricane-related 
mortality to the public was the establishment of the Department 
of Public Safety (DPS) only months prior to hurricane season. This 
was the new umbrella for seven agencies related to emergency 
management, public safety, and forensic sciences. There are two 
agencies responsible for handling mortality data in Puerto Rico: 
(1) the Demographic Registry under the Department of Health 
(DOH), which is the final destination for all death records, and 
(2) the Bureau of Forensic Sciences, which is responsible for inves-
tigating any deaths suspected to be from unnatural causes, and had 
been recently shifted under the DPS umbrella. According to study 
participants, at the time of the hurricane, the transition to fully 
integrate this newly formed agency umbrella had not yet occurred, 
and this contributed to confusion about the delegation of respon-
sibilities and processes underlying disaster mortality reporting. At 
the time of the hurricane, there was no updated, written protocol 
in place to coordinate release of information to the public between 
the two agencies. Upon creation of the DPS, decision-making 
changed for the timing and clearance of mortality data for the 
public, and one respondent perceived that the formal vetting pro-
cess had been compromised.
Emergency plans for events with mass mortality always have a uni-
fied command, where there should be periodic meetings between 
the Department of Health, Bureau of Forensic Sciences, Depart-
ment of Justice, Demographic Registry. Once the event happens, 
these meetings take place to make the decision about what infor-
mation was going to be shared with the public. When the Depart-
ment of Public Safety was created, an office which still hadn’t been 
well-formed, the hurricane came. There was confusion because it 
wasn’t Health that disseminated information on mass mortality, but 
instead DPS . . . I think that information . . . it didn’t pass formally 
through the Executive Committee because the process was disrupt-
ed, and there’s another person requesting information, even though 
it wasn’t through the official source.—Puerto Rico Government 
Agency Leadership
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Stakeholder respondents perceived this lack of coordination 
and protocol in mortality reporting as a DOH failure because 
shifts in agency responsibilities between the DPS and DOH were 
still not well-understood by community stakeholders. As noted by 
some of our participants:
It seems to me there wasn’t a coordination protocol [for mortality 
surveillance] with the Department of Health.—Municipal Emer-
gency Management Director
I went back to the Convention Center and intercepted the Secretary 
of Health, and I say to him, “Secretary, we have a situation with 
death certificates.” I don’t believe the Department of Health was as 
proactive as I expected . . . what he said was: “Go to the Center of 
Operations and raise the issue.” We went there and we raised the 
issue, went back two days later to search for a solution, but there still 
wasn’t a solution.—Municipal Mayor
Handling of Information Gaps
Due to the devastation caused by Hurricane Maria and signifi-
cant challenges to mortality surveillance, Government officials 
did not always have sufficient information to provide the public. 
Additionally, measures were not taken to explain these gaps or to 
monitor and counteract the spread of misinformation. The hurri-
cane-related death count was typically not a key message in press 
conferences, and the Governor did not talk about the death toll 
unless asked specifically, after which he confirmed the official count 
in concordance with press releases or deferred to the Secretary of 
Public Safety. According to a review of press releases, beginning 
with the first official figure of six deaths on September 22, authori-
ties clarified that more deaths were likely, but only those confirmed 
as hurricane-related would be reported, vaguely citing “safety per-
sonnel” as responsible for making this determination.
Based on a review of press materials, media coverage, and 
participant interviews, there was no overview given to the public 
to outline mortality surveillance or death certification processes. 
Spokespersons did not provide details or illustrations to facilitate 
an understanding of how these processes had been interrupted, 
and clarify reasons for delays or information gaps. As a member 
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of the Government of Puerto Rico Agency Communication Lead-
ership noted: 
The public doesn’t understand the process for certifying deaths. 
There should be a public awareness and education effort, and media 
should help convey this.
Government communications provided minimal information 
about the next steps they would take to ascertain hurricane-re-
lated deaths, and only two press releases on November 17 and 20 
informed the public about what they could do to help.
Inconsistencies occurred in the provision of details for deaths 
and unexplained increases in deaths. In press releases on Sep-
tember 24 and 25, October 11, 12, 14, 20, and November 1, 2017, 
the Government provided specifics about causes and locations of 
deaths. However, press releases from October 5, 10, and 29 did 
not follow this format, and little to no detail was provided. After 
almost a week post-hurricane, in which the death toll remained 
unchanged at 16, the controversy over mortality count transpar-
ency intensified when, after the U.S. President visited on Octo-
ber 3, the Governor of Puerto Rico announced that the death toll 
had risen from 16 to 34. This coincided with President Trump’s 
comments about the hurricane’s limited impact, and also the 
abrupt change in the level of detail provided about deaths in press 
releases. Very little explanation was given to fill information gaps 
regarding this abrupt increase. When asked about the doubling 
death count on October 4, the Governor answered that the infor-
mation they had before was insufficient, and that they are making 
sure to only count deaths certified as hurricane-related. There was 
no description of how mortality surveillance functions had been 
compromised, and as they began to be restored, that the public 
should anticipate a spike in mortality, a phenomenon known as the 
“Burkle Effect” (Burkle & Greenough, 2008). It was not explained 
that this is an expected occurrence following complex and cata-
strophic disasters. The unexplained abrupt increase in deaths con-
tributed to perceptions that the Government was manipulating 
death counts to avoid discrediting their disaster response, or evade 
blame. In one community leader’s perception:
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The government made an error in not giving the correct number 
of deaths. I think they felt threatened that people would know that  
because of their negligence so many people died . . . one of the things 
that you could tell from the media, when we finally had access, was 
the criticism was strong.
According to stakeholder respondents, this affected percep-
tions of transparency and credibility. According to two partici-
pants: 
In giving that [death] report they weren’t transparent, they weren’t 
sincere with the public. Many of us understand that there’s no rea-
son to hide it. They probably wanted to clean their image . . . I can’t 
give a reason as to why they did it because I don’t understand, but 
they weren’t transparent.—Health Center Personnel
That is what made the public so uncomfortable—they are not tell-
ing the truth, lying. I saw this and was saying, but my God, what’s 
happening? What do they want to hide?—Former Department of 
Health Personnel
The lack of clarity about the death certification process also 
persisted in media coverage, signaling a major impediment to an 
accurate count. Doctors and funeral home directors responding to 
media indicated that they did not have clear guidelines for death 
certification in disasters. Funeral directors noted that they had 
been authorized to proceed with cremations and burials if a death 
had been certified as unrelated to the hurricane. From September 
20 to October 18, there was a seemingly higher than usual autho-
rization of cremations. According to DPS personnel, these crema-
tions were misunderstood to represent hurricane-related deaths:
. . . the body would stay in the hospital if they died there. If they 
died at home and there was no electricity, they had to bury them. In 
order to bury someone, you had to request a permit and the Bureau 
of Forensic Sciences has to provide it. So, people opted to cremate 
because there wasn’t time. That’s why cremations during that time 
period increased. Also, it was cheaper. It had to be done . . . the 
increase in cremations created the perception that all people who 
were cremated died from the hurricane, but one thing has nothing 
to do with the other.
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Explanation of shifting trends in cremations were not provided 
to the public, opening space for misinterpretations, lingering sus-
picions, and questions about death reporting transparency. This 
potentially influenced public perceptions regarding the credibility 
of official death counts.
Unofficial Mortality Reports in the Information Environment 
Numerous attempts were undertaken to employ alternative pro-
cesses for identifying hurricane-related deaths. These investigative 
reports, scientific studies, and media interviews with mayors, health 
care professionals, and first responders, together with reporting of 
available figures from the Demographic Registry, created a confus-
ing post-disaster information environment. Uncertainty regarding 
the official death count was echoed by stakeholder respondents, 
who perceived that the count should have been higher given 
their experiences. As one Municipal Police Commissioner and 
Emergency Management Director noted: 
My town is small. Here we all know each other. Here there were 
weeks when I was saying, “My God, what is happening . . . every 
day someone dies!” I am sure mortality increased . . . I assure you 
that the information being provided wasn’t correct because I know 
my town. I can tell you that . . . it was after the hurricane that it  
increased. It elevated to a very alarming figure.
The perception of an undercount led these stakeholders to con-
clude that government leadership was disconnected from the real-
ities that communities throughout Puerto Rico were experiencing. 
For example, a Municipal Emergency Medical Director stated:
I believe that the impression they gave wasn’t correct because I’ve 
always said that the number given was way below the reality . . . the 
reality that I lived. My colleagues working with me and police that 
were in the street lived it. This reality wasn’t lived by people who 
were tucked away in the Command Center there in San Juan. . . . 
they didn’t live the community’s reality . . . you had to suffer that 
need . . .
Similarly, a Municipal Mayor noted, “I know, I have the num-
bers for my town, I don’t know about the country, but I know that 
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here, deaths almost doubled. I bury them. I open the gates of the 
cemetery.” Some community leaders compared official mortality 
reports to media reports and calls on the radio about missing per-
sons, which they perceived as credible firsthand sources of infor-
mation. For example, in one community leader’s perception:
That they hid information because you see the news and how people 
called the radio program saying that so-and-so is missing. Those 
people that went missing maybe died and were never found. It is 
understood that they died and that information the government 
doesn’t offer as real.
Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication Capacity 
In addition to the Government’s lack of CERC plans, there had 
been insufficient pre-hurricane CERC training of communica-
tion personnel and official spokespersons, further limiting the 
likelihood that CERC best practices would be utilized. This lack 
of CERC training was apparent in spokesperson performance 
and study respondent indication of a lack of formal training for 
communication in disasters. As one government communications 
employee noted:
When they told me to report to the Center for Operations in Emer-
gencies . . . I had no idea what we were going to face. I had to face 
a phenomenon of great proportions, but didn’t know what I was 
going to do there. I’m talking about even at the most basic, personal 
level of what to bring.
Following Hurricane Maria, there were few official spokes-
persons providing information to the public. The Governor ini-
tially conducted daily press conferences as the main spokesperson, 
although he was sometimes accompanied by others. He appeared 
to be prepared with relevant talking points, which aligned with 
press releases. He seemed to listen carefully to questions and 
responded without using overly technical language. To some 
extent, he managed uncertainty by saying what was known, iden-
tifying what was still being reviewed, and indicating willingness to 
provide information when available. However, when asked about 
deaths, he often deferred to the Secretary of Public Safety instead 
of a subject matter expert.
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The Secretary of Public Safety was also a prominent spokes-
person. In his interactions with the media, he delivered concise 
information, conveyed authority, acknowledged uncertainty in the 
mortality count, and also indicated a willingness to provide more 
information when available. However, he provided very limited 
responses to media questions, and in some cases, contradictory 
information. When asked about mortality, his responses tended to 
be relatively limited, such as “We are still reviewing” or “as soon 
as we get more data,” with no specifics provided about what was 
still being reviewed, who was reviewing it, what type of data they 
were waiting for, or why there were delays. Further, while main-
taining on numerous occasions that the government would not 
be influenced by anecdotes or assumptions, he stated in a press 
appearance on November 8 that there could be an increase of 30% 
in the average daily deaths. No details were provided to validate 
this statistic, which conflicted with previous statements, including 
one on October 1, when he speculated that deaths could increase 
“exponentially.” The ineffective use of statistics and suppositions 
may have influenced perceived credibility. 
Both the Governor and the Secretary of Public Safety failed 
to defer to subject matter experts early in the post-disaster period 
to answer questions about mortality surveillance and death cer-
tification. It was not until November 8 that the Secretary of Pub-
lic Safety called upon representatives from the Bureau of Forensic 
Sciences and the Demographic Registry to discuss these processes 
and respond to public inquiry. This coordination with subject 
matter experts occurred too late. By that time, there were already 
inconsistencies and rumors circulating in the information envi-
ronment, as well as growing stakeholder frustration.
The credibility of official messages was also called into ques-
tion with reports of contradictory or unconfirmed statements by 
other public officials. One example was the Mayor of San Juan’s 
response to the Secretary of Homeland Security, stating that the 
death count could be 10 times higher than official data. The Secre-
tary of Public Safety characterized this statement as “irresponsible,” 
but did not offer corrections. In a media interview on September 
28, the Puerto Rican Secretary of Health acknowledged that some 
Mortality Reporting and Rumor Generation 35
hospital morgues were full. According to one funeral home direc-
tor respondent, this contributed to misconceptions since deaths 
occur daily regardless of disasters:
We are more or less the same right now [in April, 2018]—there 
has not been an increase [in deaths]. People have the perception 
that many more people died . . . because in a hospital there are 10 
deaths a day, and funeral homes claim those bodies immediately . . .  
but if funeral homes cannot go . . . tomorrow they have 20 and the 
next day they have 30 . . . there is a perception that there are more  
deceased than there are.
However, the Secretary of Health gave no explanation to con-
textualize morgue capacity. This information vacuum opened an 
opportunity for misconceptions about hurricane-related deaths. 
The Secretary of Health also provided mortality data that had 
not yet been formally incorporated into the official death count. 
For example, in the interview on September 28, he indicated that 
there were seven additional deaths at hospitals, but the cause of 
death was pending; yet the official death toll was 16. The release 
of such unconfirmed, contradictory information may have influ-
enced public perceptions of credibility and transparency.
Limitations
Several limitations should be considered when interpreting study 
findings. Data was collected 7 months post-hurricane, introduc-
ing potential recall bias in respondent accounts. Additionally, 
we undertook a rapid assessment with a condensed study time-
line, limiting the digital media that could be reviewed and the 
interview sample size. We did, however, focus our digital media 
review on pivotal points in the availability of information, and 
interviewed a number of key actors within the Government who 
were involved in mortality data management or communication. 
Furthermore, we recruited interview respondents with diversity 
in a number of criteria that were likely to affect a community’s 
experiences with the hurricane. Regardless of the sample size, we 
reached saturation.
36 ANDRADE, BARRETT, EDBERG, RIVERA, SEEGER, ET AL.
Discussion
The days and weeks following Hurricane Maria were characterized 
by widespread criticism of the Government of Puerto Rico’s han-
dling of mortality reporting. In addition to the hurricane’s after-
math, there was also a crisis of death toll uncertainty. Not only did 
this issue dominate discourse, detracting from other important 
issues post-hurricane, it also raised key questions about planning 
for similar complex disasters. The experiences of Hurricane Maria 
highlighted areas of prospective research and practice that should 
be prioritized by scientific and disaster communities, and signaled 
areas related to disaster impact communication that should be 
expanded upon in CERC guidelines—mortality communication 
and communicating in catastrophic disaster contexts. 
CERC Guidelines and Information Vacuums 
One goal of communication in disasters is to provide accurate, 
timely information to the public. According to CERC and WHO 
guidelines (CDC, 2014; WHO, 2005), government administra-
tions and disaster response organizations can build public con-
fidence by having coordinated, transparent information sharing, 
and trained spokespersons and subject matter experts to provide 
consistent information and explanations. The Government faced 
difficulties communicating about mortality, stemming from a lack 
of CERC plans and the timing of recent government restructuring 
that complicated coordination. These challenges were exacerbated 
by not anticipating widespread infrastructure failures and a lack of 
communicator CERC training. 
Another goal of communication in disasters is to minimize 
misinformation, which includes monitoring the information envi-
ronment and counteracting rumors (Liu et al., 2014; Savoia et al., 
2017; Seeger, 2006). Following Hurricane Maria, the politicization 
of the death count resulted in part from information gaps coupled 
with insufficient monitoring and rumor control. Major interrup-
tions to mortality surveillance resulted in delayed reporting and 
a substantial information vacuum. Official and unofficial mor-
tality reports proliferated in the media to fill this void, contrib-
uting to stakeholder perceptions that questioned credibility and 
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transparency of the Government of Puerto Rico. In the context 
of waning public trust, overall disaster response capabilities can 
become greatly diminished. 
Additionally, Government of Puerto Rico personnel did not 
recount efforts to engage with stakeholders on social media or sys-
tematically monitor this digital information environment as part 
of an overarching communication strategy. Official press confer-
ences were streamed on the Governor’s Facebook Live account, but 
there were no coordinated efforts taken to monitor and respond to 
misinformation or rumors. Given the potential of social media for 
disseminating verified information and minimizing the spread of 
rumors, this was a missed opportunity. Practitioners engaged in 
disaster preparedness planning should integrate social media use 
into daily operations, dedicating personnel to facilitating stake-
holder relationships, and monitoring and responding to public 
reactions during crisis. 
Situations also arose following the hurricane that were inade-
quately explained by spokespersons. These information gaps cre-
ated opportunities for the public to question the Government’s 
motives and speculate as to why the information was unavail-
able, when it was not necessarily a question of motive. Even in 
the absence of timely mortality data, the processes of mortality 
surveillance and death certification could have been described 
and barriers to these processes detailed. These occurrences follow-
ing Hurricane Maria raise the question about how governments 
and disaster response organizations can adequately prepare to 
communicate in catastrophic disasters, where the likelihood of 
information vacuums is high, mortality surveillance is at risk for 
disruption, and high levels of public interest and media coverage 
can be anticipated. An important consideration is how informa-
tion vacuums should be handled; however, while CERC guidelines 
address the correction of misinformation and misperceptions in 
the media, they do not elaborate on how information vacuums 
should be handled by disaster communicators. Furthermore, 
CERC guidelines delineating communication plan design and 
implementation do not address catastrophic disaster situations, 
when the communication landscape drastically changes and con-
tingencies are required to maintain communication functions. 
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Drawing from lessons learned following Hurricane Maria, current 
CERC guidelines should be expanded to address these important 
areas. With guidelines for communicating following catastrophic 
disasters, planning can be undertaken to anticipate factors such 
as elevated mortality yet disrupted mortality surveillance systems, 
information vacuums accompanied by intense media interest, 
and toppled communication infrastructure necessitating con-
tingencies. With catastrophic CERC guidelines, communicators 
following Hurricane Maria would have been better positioned to 
prepare for substantial information vacuums and address them 
more effectively through messaging and responding to the rapidly 
evolving information environment; have communication plans 
and contingencies in place to enable information sharing and 
message coordination, including with local stakeholders through-
out Puerto Rico; and anticipate mortality as a key point of public 
interest and vital piece of information for disaster responders and 
policymakers. 
Communicating Post-Disaster Mortality 
Risks to credibility, trust, and transparency can be mitigated in 
part by having spokespersons who are highly trained in the subject 
matter, and who place as much importance on the message itself 
as the manner in which the message is communicated. CERC and 
WHO recommendations detail considerations of spokesperson 
selection, characteristics, and training. CERC and WHO guide-
lines also highlight the importance of delivering early messaging 
from information sources that build credibility through illustra-
tive descriptions for complex topics, background information, 
supporting facts, third-party validations, and explanations of sit-
uations that may be questioned by the public. While Government 
of Puerto Rico spokespersons were experienced in public speak-
ing, the lack of CERC media training was notable. This was evi-
denced by spokesperson performance during press conferences 
and media interviews, as well as accounts from study participants 
who indicated that they had not been trained in disaster commu-
nication. Spokesperson missteps, including vague responses when 
asked about disaster mortality, the use of inconsistent statistics, 
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speculation about anticipated mortality counts, late involvement 
of subject matter experts in press conferences, lack of supportive 
materials to explain death certification, communication of deaths 
to the media that had not yet been confirmed as hurricane-re-
lated, and inconsistent messaging between official spokespersons, 
created a post-disaster information environment saturated with 
criticism and diminished credibility of the Government of Puerto 
Rico’s efforts. 
Future disaster preparedness efforts should emphasize spokes-
person and communication personnel training related to mortality 
surveillance processes and communicating with the public about 
mortality, especially following catastrophic events. This raises the 
questions: What is the best way to communicate with the public 
about disaster mortality, and what do we know about how public 
audiences understand and interpret mortality estimates? The cur-
rent CERC and WHO guidelines do not include a nuanced dis-
cussion of communicating disaster mortality to the public. Future 
research should explore these areas in order to inform best prac-
tices. 
Conclusion
The response and recovery period following Hurricane Maria 
was punctuated by significant controversy surrounding mortality 
reporting. Puerto Rican Government officials provided informa-
tion they had available to them at the time and made attempts to be 
open and transparent. Given the level of destruction experienced 
in Puerto Rico, it is likely that delays in mortality surveillance and 
temporary information gaps were inevitable. However, given these 
circumstances, not applying CERC best practices and inadequate 
CERC training led to unexplained information gaps and incon-
sistencies that contributed to rumors and controversy. Confusion 
was intensified by numerous unofficial death counts in the infor-
mation environment. Ultimately, the Government of Puerto Rico 
lost the ability to effectively manage messaging, thus decreasing 
their source credibility, perceived transparency, and public trust. 
While an essential role of government in disasters is to protect the 
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public from risk, the mortality count controversy drained political 
capital and detracted from efforts to meet population health and 
safety needs. 
These experiences highlight the importance of CERC planning 
and training, which should be expanded to include guidelines 
for disasters of catastrophic scale where key resources and infra-
structure are impacted, communication channels are similarly 
degraded, and information vacuums are likely to occur. Future 
research should examine the role of a robust CERC response in 
disaster communications, as well as examine application of the 
CERC model across diverse disasters and contexts, including 
those with considerable resource constraints (Avery, 2019). These 
occurrences also emphasize the need for more impact communi-
cation research, or communicating to the public about a disaster’s 
impact, including mortality. Little is known about how audiences 
process disaster mortality information. Consensus in this area 
will inform development of anticipatory educational materials, 
spokesperson training and key messages, guidelines for inter- 
sectoral and stakeholder collaboration, and recommendations for 
navigating the post-disaster information environment.
Archived links from Table 1
CDC CERC manual guidelines. Retrieved from web archive:
https://web.archive.org/web/20190614141121/https://emergency.
cdc.gov/cerc/manual/index.asp
WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health Emergencies 
handbook. Retrieved from web archive: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190418231742/https://www.who.
int/csr/resources/publications/WHO_CDS_2005_31/en/
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ABSTRACT
In order to properly evaluate crises that occur in sports, scholars have previously called 
for a sports-specific crisis communication typology (Wilson et al., 2010). Two studies 
were conducted to develop the resulting typology. Study 1 utilized a questionnaire 
to obtain a comprehensive list of sports-related crises that were later grouped into 
12 crisis types and three unique clusters through the use of qualitative content analy-
sis. Study 2 utilized a questionnaire completed by 282 college students to determine 
the levels of crisis responsibility attributed to each cluster of crises. The resulting typol-
ogy provides the necessary foundation for crisis communication research that uses 
sports as a context by evaluating the level of organizational blame that exists when a 
crisis occurs. 
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In 1919, eight Chicago Black Sox baseball players were accused 
of accepting bribes from gamblers and intentionally losing the 
World Series. The scandal rocked the sporting world and landed 
on the front page of all major newspapers, marking the first time 
the mainstream media prioritized the coverage of a sports-related 
scandal. Today, sports scandals continue to receive vast amounts 
of public scrutiny. Controversy surrounding issues of drug use, 
domestic violence, sexual assault, racism, sexism, gambling, brib-
ery, concussions, and more quite literally play out on the sports 
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field while concurrently dominating media coverage. Because of 
the large emphasis culture places on sports (Raney, 2006), such 
scandals impact a vast audience as they dominate sports media 
headlines and online trending topic lists. 
Sports scandals permeate popular culture, as perhaps no other 
form of entertainment connects as closely to a person’s self-esteem 
as their sports team affiliation (Wann, 2006). When a crisis strikes 
a sports organization or player, it often negatively affects their key 
stakeholders, sports fans (N. A. Brown & Billings, 2013). Specifi-
cally, crises that impact sports organizations and athletes have the 
ability to cause harm by tarnishing a team or athlete’s reputation or 
impairing their in-game performance. Additionally, the negative 
fallout from recent sports-related crises shows their impact has 
progressed beyond the field, including the potential to damage a 
university’s entire organizational brand (e.g., Michigan State/Larry 
Nassar scandal; Penn State scandal; Baylor University scandal). 
In order to address the impact of sports-related crises, this 
study seeks to test a primary component of Coombs’s (1999b) sit-
uational crisis communication theory (SCCT) by examining the 
level of crisis responsibility attributed to a sports organization in 
crisis. Coombs and Holladay (2002) noted that organizations can 
improve the overall effectiveness of their crisis responses by evalu-
ating the level of responsibility that stakeholders attribute to them 
during crises. By exploring the different types of crises that sports 
organizations encounter, this study seeks to answer the call of Wil-
son et al. (2010) to establish a typology of crises that impact sports 
organizations, which the authors noted would be valuable for 
sports crisis scholars by allowing them to more effectively define 
and examine sports-related crises. 
Thus, this manuscript features two studies to measure the 
level of crisis responsibility attributed to each type of sports- 
related crisis. Following the methodology of Mitroff, Pauchant, 
and Shrivastava (1988), the first study surveyed sports communi-
cation researchers to form a comprehensive list of sports-related 
crises, which was then clustered through the use of conventional 
qualitative content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). In the sec-
ond study, researchers replicated the methodology utilized by 
Coombs and Holladay (2002) and administered a quantitative 
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survey of 282 college students to evaluate the level of crisis respon-
sibility attributed to an organization during each type of crisis. The 
survey also helped the researchers determine how each type of cri-
sis impacts an organization’s reputation and the amount of control 
stakeholders perceive an organization had over the situation.
Literature Review
Crisis Communication Typologies 
Coombs (2012) defines a crisis as the “perception of an unpredict-
able event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders 
related to health, safety, environment, and economic issues, and 
can seriously impact an organization’s performance and generates 
negative outcomes” (p. 3). Communication scholars have long 
evaluated the reputational threat that results from organizational 
crises (Coombs, 2012; Coombs & Holladay, 1996). Coombs and 
Holladay (2002) noted that an organization’s reputation is a valu-
able asset among stakeholders; and, as such, reputational threats 
should be avoided. When crises do befall an organization, stake-
holders typically re-evaluate the favorability of an organization’s 
reputation, prompting organizations to strategically engage in rep-
utation repair (Coombs & Holladay, 2005).
Scholarship has long investigated how to best respond to a 
plethora of crises. Benson (1988) suggested a need for a theoreti-
cal approach to address the following tenets: (1) synthesize exist-
ing crisis communication literature into a typology of crisis types 
that might alarm an organization; (2) synthesize reputation repair 
strategies that can be utilized during a crisis; and (3) establish a 
theoretical linkage between the type of crisis an organization faces 
and the corresponding repair strategy that should be selected. This 
call was later addressed by Coombs’s (1999b) SCCT.
SCCT champions the importance of beginning a crisis response 
by first analyzing the type of crisis that threatens an organization 
in order to guide the effective selection of a reputation repair strat-
egy (Coombs, 1999b). Coombs (2012) noted that to evaluate the 
reputational threat a certain crisis poses, three factors must be 
addressed: crisis type, crisis history, and prior reputation. In order 
to address the first factor, Coombs and Holladay (2002) developed 
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a list of crisis types and the levels of crisis responsibility associated 
with each. Coombs and Holladay (2002) defined a crisis type as 
“the frame that publics use to interpret an event” (p. 167). Their 
list featured 10 crisis types that were placed into one of three dif-
ferent categories: victim crises (resulting in minimal crisis respon-
sibility), accident crises (resulting in low crisis responsibility), and 
preventable crises (resulting in strong crisis responsibility). These 
crisis clusters are “premised on the logic of crisis portfolios: simi-
lar crises can be managed in similar fashions” (Coombs & Holla-
day, 2002, p. 180). While Coombs and Holladay’s (2002) typology 
has been widely used in crisis scholarship, its methodology has 
not yet been replicated by other crisis scholars to create additional 
crisis typologies.
This concept is meant to simplify the process of selecting opti-
mal response strategies that are associated with similar crises. 
By first acknowledging the type of crisis an organization faces, 
crisis managers can determine the amount of blame and crisis 
responsibility stakeholders attribute to the organization, itself 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2002). SCCT states that the more crisis 
responsibility the public attributes to an organization, the more 
accommodating an organization will need to be toward the vic-
tims when selecting reputation repair strategies (Coombs, 2012). 
Essentially, a proper evaluation of crisis type should improve the 
overall effectiveness of a crisis response (Coombs & Holladay, 
2002). After analyzing the crisis type, a crisis manager should 
adjust his/her initial assessment of attribution, which depends 
upon other significant factors such as the organization’s crisis his-
tory and its prior relationship with stakeholders. Only then should 
a crisis manager select a proper reputation repair strategy. 
Crisis Communication and Sports
The combination of media prominence of sports issues and an 
“increased activism of sports fans” led to a surge of sports crisis 
communication research (K. A. Brown et al., 2012, p. 155). The 
expansion of sports-centric programming channels such as ESPN 
and Fox Sports created print, broadcast, online, and mobile out-
lets dedicated to covering every aspect of sports, including sports 
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scandals. While the uncertainty of sports outcomes establishes a 
certain amount of inherent drama, a crisis striking the field of play 
can only heighten that effect. Such growth in exposure and interest 
can increase sports organizations’ profitability. Thus, researchers 
wanted to determine the extent to which a sports team or athlete’s 
reputation affected them financially by exploring the intersection 
of sports and crisis management (Brazeal, 2008). The resulting 
sports crisis communication research primarily examined sports 
crises through the use of image repair theory (IRT) and SCCT 
(Benoit & Hanczor, 1994; Brazeal, 2008; N. A. Brown & Billings, 
2013; K. A. Brown et al., 2012). 
Rationale for Sports-Specific Crisis Typology
While previous sports crises have been evaluated using SCCT’s 
reputation repair strategies (Brown & Billings, 2013; Richards et 
al., 2017; Williams & Olaniran, 2002), Brown et al. (2015) noted 
that SCCT’s typology does not fully encompass sports-related cri-
ses and, as a result, scholars have been unable to fully test SCCT’s 
theoretical linkages in the sports context. As such, the Coombs 
and Holladay (2002) typology has not been utilized by sports-re-
lated crisis research. Perhaps this is unsurprising given Björck’s 
(2016) claim that “a single typology cannot capture the complex-
ity and interdisciplinary nature of a crisis” (p. 1). Therefore, con-
text-specific crisis typologies have been developed in areas such as 
tourism (Laws & Prideaux, 2008), restaurant management (Tse & 
Sin, 2006), governmental relations (Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997), 
and, of course, corporate contexts (Coombs, 1999a). 
Björck (2016) noted that crisis scholarship should formulate 
typologies that reflect important “cultural and contextual dimen-
sions” (p. 1), such as the unique nature of sports and its vital cul-
tural significance (Raney, 2006). In order to address this need for 
typologies in the sports context, Wilson et al. (2010) established an 
initial framework for classifying sports-related crises (i.e., “unin-
tentional/intentional” and “internal/external”), and noted that 
future scholars should incorporate a quantitative component to 
this area of research. Yet, scholarly examinations of sports-spe-
cific crises must account for the fact that crises can result from 
54 BROWN-DEVLIN and BROWN
individual or organizational actions. As noted by Sato et al. (2015), 
Wilson et al.’s initial framework would need to be expanded upon 
to incorporate “the unique characteristics of athlete reputational 
challenges that distinguish them from other celebrity scandals” 
(p. 436), and how athlete actions that violate the “nature of sport” 
can also impact the larger organization’s reputation. Additionally, 
Hughes and Shank (2005) sought to define characteristics of a 
sports scandal in order to aid sports scholars’ understanding of 
the impact of such issues. However, they did not formulate a cri-
sis typology with their results. Yet, the authors did call for future 
research that would help scholars quantitatively understand both 
the short- and long-term impacts of sports scandals on stakehold-
ers’ affiliations with sports organizations. 
Previous scholarship displays a clear need for a crisis commu-
nication typology in the context of sports that can aid scholars 
who explore sports-related crises quantitatively, and are guided by 
theories such as SCCT (Wilson et al., 2010). While both corpora-
tions and sports teams are often thought of as organizations driven 
by profits, the largest threats to each of their reputations are too 
unique to be placed under one conceptual umbrella. Thus, in order 
to further extend the work of Wilson et al., the following research 
question is proffered: 
RQ1: What types of crises do sports organizations and athletes 
commonly face? 
In order to establish a sports crisis communication typology, a 
list of crisis types provides crisis managers with some guidance in 
their selection of response strategies. Wilson et al. (2010) advised 
future scholars to draw upon tenets of SCCT, namely attribution 
theory, when further developing sports-related crisis communi-
cation research. Coombs and Holladay (2002) noted that crisis 
managers must ascertain the level of crisis responsibility the pub-
lic attributes to the offending organization in order to choose a 
response strategy with the proper level of accommodation toward 
the victims. SCCT (Coombs, 2012) includes a list of 10 crisis types 
divided into three clusters ranging from a minimal amount of cri-
sis responsibility to a strong amount of crisis responsibility: victim 
crises, accident crises, and preventable crises (Coombs, 2012). In 
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order to establish a sports crisis communication typology, a list of 
sports crises must be categorized according to the level of crisis 
responsibility perceived by the public. Thus, the following research 
question is offered: 
RQ2: Based on amount of responsibility attributed, what clusters 
will emerge from the list of crises? 
One of the central tenets of SCCT posits that “perception of 
crisis responsibility is directly correlated [with] reputational dam-
age,” meaning that as crisis responsibility increases, the possibility 
of damage to an organization’s reputation also increases (Coombs 
& Holladay, 2002, p. 173). The correlation between crisis respon-
sibility and organizational reputation is the key linkage in SCCT; 
therefore, this new typology must also demonstrate this linkage. 
Thus, the researchers posit the following hypothesis:
H1: A direct correlation will exist between crisis responsibility and 
organizational reputation for each of the clusters. 
Study 1 Methods
Initial Qualitative Questionnaire 
Following the methodology of Mitroff et al. (1988), research-
ers contacted an expert panel of sports communication scholars 
through member listservs of two scholarly organizations devoted 
to sports communication research: the Association for Education 
in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC) Sports 
Communication Interest Group and the International Association 
of Communication and Sport (IACS). The researchers gathered 
responses and created a database of potential crises that plague 
athletes or teams, as this initial list would be synthesized into a 
typology of crises that ideally would be comprehensive with few 
potential outliers. The researchers provided members of each list-
serv with a link to an online survey that contained a single open-
ended question requesting scholars to brainstorm a list of crises 
that have affected, or could have affected, sports teams and/or 
athletes in recent years. Scholars employed their own definition 
of what constituted a crisis when responding to the questionnaire 
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and were encouraged to list crises that affected all sports. The initial 
survey yielded responses from 23 researchers, and produced a list 
of 263 sports crises, which encompassed crises that have affected 
virtually every imaginable sport from badminton to baseball. 
Qualitative Content Analysis and Formation of Crisis Types 
The authors then utilized conventional qualitative content anal-
ysis as described by Hsieh and Shannon (2005), where the data 
gathered from the open-ended survey questions were then used to 
generate a list of crisis types. Qualitative content analysis was uti-
lized since it is ideal for concept development (Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005; Lindkvist, 1981). Conventional qualitative content analysis 
provides a method for researchers to “combine or organize this 
larger number of subcategories into a smaller number of catego-
ries” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1279). 
To follow the procedures as described by Hsieh and Shannon 
(2005), the primary author examined the qualitative survey data 
guided by Coombs’s (2012) definition of a crisis, and made notes 
on initial impressions of the crises so that labels for codes emerged. 
In order to follow the method used in the development of pre-
vious crisis management typologies (Mitroff et al., 1988; Wilson 
et al., 2010), the author began grouping each response based on 
traditional crisis communication variables (internal/external cri-
sis, individual/organizational, etc.), to develop groupings based on 
“how different codes are related and linked” (Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005). Each included crisis had to fit Coombs’s (2012) definition of 
a crisis, and accordingly present one of the following three threats: 
public safety, financial loss, or reputation loss. 
Twelve crisis types resulted from this process. Hsieh and Shan-
non (2005) noted that, ideally, the numbers of clusters that result 
from conventional qualitative content analysis will be between 10 
and 15. The project’s co-author examined the development of each 
crisis type to ensure there was agreement regarding the resulting 
list, as was recommended by Elo et al. (2014). In order to ensure 
face validity, the authors followed the recommendation by Elo 
et al. and presented the list during a conference panel comprised 
of sports scholars prior to publication in order to garner feedback. 
Scholars who attended the presentation agreed that a sport-specific 
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typology would greatly aid crisis communication scholars who 
conduct research in the sports context and did not recommend 
any changes to the presented typology. They did, however, recom-
mend using it in additional studies to continue to validate it. 
Study 1 Results
The first research question focused on synthesizing the crises pro-
vided during the initial survey into a crisis typology. Based on the 
list of crises, a typology of 12 crises was formed, divided tenta-
tively into two categories for the sake of discussion: internal crises 
and external crises. Appendix A provides specific examples from 
the questionnaire results for each crisis type. 
Internal crises directly affect the field of play. There are six of 
these crisis types. Internal criminal transgressions include actions 
that involve a sports figure that leads directly to an arrest, legal 
action, and/or conviction that happened during a competition. 
Logistical and operational issues involve issues that affect the view-
ing of a sports event that were not caused by a natural disaster. 
Amateurism transgressions consist of issues that affect the amateur 
status of a sports figure (notably college or Olympic-style competi-
tors). Competition transgressions contain actions involving a sports 
figure or team that directly compromises the fair nature of com-
petition. Player/coach management issues encompass issues sur-
rounding a sports figure that would directly affect the team’s active 
roster or coaching staff, such as illegal or unethical firings, espe-
cially those that result in legal action. Misleading internal informa-
tion involves statements or other information provided by a sports 
figure related to internal operations that causes some controversy 
or compromises his/her position with the team.
External crises indirectly affect the field of play. There are also 
six of these crisis types. External criminal transgressions involve 
actions involving a sports figure that leads directly to an arrest, 
legal action, and/or conviction that did not happen during the 
course of competition. Personal lifestyle transgressions result from 
actions involving a sports figure that affect his/her personal life, but 
do not lead to an arrest and/or conviction (more morally wrong 
than criminally wrong). Controversial statements/actions consist of 
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statements or actions made by a sports figure that are inappropri-
ate or that caused some controversy, but did not lead directly to an 
arrest and/or conviction, and did not address some aspect of the 
team. “Act of God” events are actions that affect a sports figure or 
a team that were outside of his/her/its control. League/conference 
management issues result from issues surrounding a team affilia-
tion or league operations that do not directly affect the course of 
competition.
Study 2 Method
In order to establish a sports crisis communication typology, 
the list of sports crises generated in study 1 must be categorized 
according to the level of crisis responsibility perceived by sports 
audiences. 
Quantitative Survey and Measurement of Crisis  
Responsibility 
After the qualitative survey and qualitative content analysis, 
researchers conducted a full administration of the crisis typol-
ogy to assign levels of crisis responsibility. The researchers used a 
method similar to Coombs and Holladay’s (2002) method of clus-
tering organizational crises according to its level of responsibility, 
which ranged from minimal crisis responsibility to strong crisis 
responsibility. In order to measure the level of crisis responsibil-
ity associated with each of the crisis types synthesized from the 
pilot study, the researchers distributed an online survey hosted by 
Qualtrics to participants. The authors selected articles from ESPN.
com reporting on a crisis that could be classified into one of each 
of the 12 resulting categories. The 12 articles used in the study 
included an average of 550 words, which lead to approximately 
1.5 double-spaced pages. Appendix A provides definitions and 
examples of each crisis type. Participants were given as much 
time as needed to read the articles and answer the questions that 
followed. To prevent survey fatigue, participants were randomly 
assigned by the Qualtrics software to evaluate only two of the cri-
sis types. Participants were asked to read each article and answer 
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items to help evaluate the level of crisis responsibility associated 
with each crisis. 
Questionnaire
In order to measure the amount of crisis responsibility attributed 
to each of the 12 resulting crisis types, the researchers designed a 
22-item questionnaire to measure organizational reputation, per-
sonal control, and crisis responsibility. A sample consisting of 282 
college students from a large Southeastern university was utilized 
for this study. The sample was 25% male (n = 72) with ages ranging 
from 18 to 29 (M = 20.4, SD = 1.3). While Coombs and Holladay 
(2002) noted that students are not generally the primary audience 
for corporate crisis response, Enoch (2011) stated that people ages 
18–24 classify themselves as avid sports fans. Therefore, college 
students constitute a large audience for crises involving sports 
organizations and/or athletes and are a valuable population to 
examine.
Organizational reputation. The researchers measured organiza-
tional reputation using five 7-point Likert scales adapted from 
Coombs and Holladay’s (1996) Organizational Reputation Scale 
(α = 0.806). This scale is an adaptation of McCroskey’s (1966) 
scale used to measure credibility, and included items such as “The 
organization is basically DISHONEST,” and “Under most circum-
stances, I would be likely to believe what the organization says.” 
The items were combined to create a composite mean score. This 
scale was also utilized in a study that sampled the same population 
by K. A. Brown et al. (2015). 
Personal control. Researchers measured personal control using 
four 7-point Likert scales adapted from McAuley et al.’s (1992) 
Causal Dimension Scale II (α = 0.745). These items measured the 
degree to which the event is controllable by the organization, and 
included items such as “The cause of the crisis is something that 
was manageable by the organization,” and “The cause of the crisis 
is something over which the organization had no power.” 
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Crisis responsibility. Crisis responsibility was measured using 
Griffin et al.’s (1992) three 7-point Likert scales for measuring 
blame. Coombs and Holladay (2002) noted this scale is accept-
able for measuring crisis responsibility of an organization. The 
scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.72 and included items such as 
“Circumstances, not the organization are responsible for the crisis” 
and “The blame for the crisis lies with the organization.” Based on 
previous research, Coombs and Holladay (2002) treated personal 
control and crisis responsibility as one common variable, and 
combined the two scales into one variable of “crisis responsibility.” 
Based on a principal components factor analysis with a Varimax 
rotation, similar to Coombs and Holladay (2002), the items used in 
this study loaded under one factor as well, accounting for 47.52% 
of the variance with an eigenvalue of 3.327. The final scale had a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.79. Thus, the two scales were combined to 
form a crisis responsibility composite mean score.
Other questionnaire items. The instrument included two questions 
to check comprehension. After participants read each news arti-
cle, items asked “What is the name of the organization accused 
in the preceding article?” and “What is the crisis presented in the 
preceding article?” Participants that offered incorrect responses to 
the two questions were excluded from the sample. The question-
naire yielded a total of 562 article responses, since each participant 
viewed two news articles. Yet, incorrect responses to knowledge 
questions eliminated 57 responses, bringing the total number of 
responses to 505. Each participant also answered a four-item fan 
identification scale adapted from Wann and Branscombe (1993) 
Sports Spectator Identification Scale (SSIS). Finally, four items 
measured demographics such as age, gender, ethnicity, and edu-
cational status. SPSS version 20.0 was used to analyze all collected 
data. 
Study 2 Results
The second research question focused on grouping the 12 crisis 
types into clusters. Similar to the method used by Coombs and 
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Holladay (2002), a hierarchical cluster analysis was used to create 
homogeneous clusters of crisis types based on similar characteris-
tics. Since crisis responsibility is central to this typology, just like 
in SCCT, it was the variable used to create the crisis clusters. This 
method creates clusters so that the members of the same cluster 
have a stronger degree of association among themselves, but a 
weaker degree of association between themselves and members of 
a different cluster (Coombs & Holladay, 2002).
TABLE 1 Crisis Typology and Mean Scores for Three-Cluster Solution
Crisis  
Responsibility
Organizational  
Reputation
Environmental/ 
Individual Crisis M = 3.10 (SD = 0.997) M = 4.96 (SD = 1.075)
“Act of God” Event M = 2.56 (SD = 1.034) M = 5.23 (SD = 0.931)
Controversial Statement/
Action M = 3.12 (SD = 1.010) M = 5.17 (SD = 1.119)
Personal Lifestyle 
Transgression M = 3.25 (SD = 1.096) M = 5.02 (SD = 1.280)
External Criminal 
Transgression M = 3.16 (SD = 0.947) M = 4.64 (SD = 0.996)
Internal Criminal 
Transgression M = 3.40 (SD = 0.714) M = 4.80 (SD = 0.997)
Rules and Norms 
Violations M = 3.71 (SD = 0.899) M = 4.86 (SD = 1.036)
Fan Involvement Issue M = 3.69 (SD = 0.914) M = 4.90 (SD = 1.126)
Amateurism Transgression M = 3.70 (SD = 1.028) M = 4.75 (SD = 0.920)
Competition 
Transgression M = 3.74 (SD = 0.768) M = 4.85 (SD = 1.070)
Organizational 
Mismanagement M = 4.22 (SD = 0.873) M = 4.47 (SD = 0.931)
League/Conference 
Management Issue M = 4.02 (SD = 0.875) M = 4.76 (SD = 0.922)
Logistical/Operational 
Issue M = 4.30 (SD = 0.908) M = 4.43 (SD = 0.859)
Misleading Internal 
Information M = 4.35 (SD = 0.911) M = 4.38 (SD = 1.006)
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Based on the agglomeration schedule using Ward’s method, 
a more efficient method of measuring distance between clusters 
due to its analysis of variance approach (Burns & Burns, 2009), 
the optimal cluster grouping was a three-cluster solution. Much 
less distinguishing existed between cases for subsequent cluster-
ing after the three-cluster solution. A one-way ANOVA found the 
cluster solution was a good fit, based on the cluster’s crisis respon-
sibility and organizational reputation scores. Table 1 provides the 
mean scores for the three-cluster solution. Significant differences 
existed among the three clusters for crisis responsibility (F (2, 502) 
= 68.785; p < 0.001) and organizational reputation (F (2, 502) = 
11.409; p < 0.001). 
The first cluster that resulted from the study was the “environ-
mental/individual crisis” cluster. This cluster included the follow-
ing crisis types: act of God event, controversial statement/action, 
personal lifestyle transgression, external criminal transgression, 
and internal criminal transgression. The crises in this initial clus-
ter result from the actions of a specific individual or from an 
environmental event that are perceived to be outside of the orga-
nization’s realm of control. Thus, such crises result in the lowest 
level of organizational crisis responsibility. 
“Rules and norms violations” was the second cluster that 
emerged from the study. This cluster included the following cri-
sis types: fan involvement issues, amateurism transgressions, and 
competition transgressions. The crises in this cluster all involve 
a rule being broken by the organization and a moderate level of 
organizational crisis responsibility is attributed to these crises.
“Organizational mismanagement” was the final cluster that 
emerged from the study. This cluster included the following crisis 
types: league/conference management issue, logistical/operational 
issue, player/coach management issue, and misleading internal 
information. These crises all involve an issue that should be located 
within the organization’s realm of control; yet, the organization’s 
mismanagement of that issue led to the crisis. Therefore, the orga-
nization possesses a high level of crisis responsibility attributed to 
crises in this cluster. 
Hypothesis 1 examined the relationship between crisis respon-
sibility and organizational reputation—the key linkage in SCCT. 
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The hypothesis posited that there would be a significant correla-
tion for each of the three clusters. Based on the analysis, there was 
a negative, significant correlation for each cluster, meaning that 
the theoretical association between responsibility and reputation 
was present (Cluster 1: r (207) = –0.584; p < 0.001; Cluster 2: r 
(128) = –0.328; p < 0.001; Cluster 3: r (170) = –0.286; p < 0.001). 
Thus, hypothesis 1 was supported. 
Discussion
Theoretical Contribution 
This study establishes an important intersection of sports schol-
arship and crisis communication that aids scholars who wish to 
empirically examine crises in the sports context. First, this research 
provided an important theoretical contribution for crisis commu-
nication scholarship, as it was the first to replicate the Coombs 
and Holladay (2002) study. The findings confirmed the relation-
ship between crisis responsibility and organizational reputation 
and supplied evidence to the use of hierarchical cluster analysis 
to create and analyze crisis typologies. While there could be con-
cerns that contextually-specific crisis typologies such as the one 
that resulted from this study could decrease the comparability of 
results from differing contexts, this study’s results show that it is 
possible to both conceptualize the unique crises that impact orga-
nizations in a context-specific typology and have the principle the-
oretical association between responsibility and reputation persist. 
Thus, the theoretical linkage of SCCT that is rooted in attribution 
theory should still persist and protect primary theoretical applica-
tions across contexts. This notion should be further examined by 
future research. 
Additionally, as the number of sports-related scandals grow 
in both number and notoriety, the need to examine them with a 
proper theoretical lens also grows. This study initiates an impor-
tant first step toward the development of a sports-related crisis 
communication typology by providing a synthesized list of poten-
tial crises that impact sports organizations. Coombs (2012) noted 
that three factors must be considered before engaging in crisis 
response: crisis type, crisis history, and prior reputation. While 
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this study classifies crises into clusters based on similarly attributed 
levels of organizational responsibility, it is important to note that 
levels of resulting organizational blame can be heightened by an 
organization’s crisis history and prior reputation. For instance, 
Coombs and Holladay (2002) noted that these factors can create 
a Velcro effect, where a negative reputation can lead to increased 
reputational damage. Conversely, a positive reputation can help an 
organization outlast a crisis, which is called the halo effect. 
Crisis Typology Clusters
The 12 crisis types that resulted from this study were classified 
into three distinct clusters: environmental/individual crisis, rules 
violation, and organizational mismanagement. First, the “envi-
ronmental/individual crisis” cluster results from the actions of 
an individual associated with the organization or from an envi-
ronmental event. This cluster’s low level of crisis responsibility 
suggests that the audience does not hold the organization largely 
responsible for the actions of each individual. The low level of 
organizational blame associated with this cluster suggests that the 
organization’s reputation does not face a strong threat from these 
crises. However, the reputational threat sometimes increases when 
assessing crisis history and prior reputation (Coombs, 2012). 
For example, despite the University of Florida’s on-field suc-
cesses during Head Coach Urban Meyer’s tenure, a string of over 
30 player arrests eventually forced some media members to ques-
tion the direction and discipline record of the Florida football 
program (Hyde, 2010). Thus, this example shows how the acts of 
individual players harmed the organization’s reputation by boost-
ing this crisis to the next level of organizational responsibility. 
The “rules and norms violation” cluster involves rules that 
sports organizations either violated or overlooked. This cluster 
results in a moderate level of crisis responsibility being attributed 
to the organization, as fans expect sports teams to protect the her-
alded integrity and fairness of the game (Pawlenka, 2005). The 
“rules and norms violation” cluster possesses a strong dependence 
upon the factors of crisis history and prior reputation when deter-
mining the resulting crisis responsibility level. Audiences might 
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forgive a first-time offender when rules are violated, as organiza-
tions can claim ignorance. However, if an organization is a repeat 
offender, the current crisis would present a much larger repu-
tational threat (Coombs & Holladay, 2005). Repeat offenses are 
likely to increase the perceived crisis responsibility from the mod-
erate level typically associated with this cluster to the strong level 
of crisis responsibility typically associated with the organizational 
mismanagement cluster. 
The final cluster, “organizational mismanagement,” resulted 
in the highest amount of crisis responsibility being attributed to 
the sports organization. All crises classified into this cluster arose 
from the organization’s own mismanagement. The public is unfor-
giving of crises that are preventable through proper management 
techniques. Organizations that face crises in this cluster also face 
a strong reputational threat and must select crisis response strate-
gies accordingly.
Crisis Communication and Fandom
It must be noted that the mean scores that resulted from this 
study suggest that while participants did rank the organizational 
mismanagement cluster more highly, the scores were still in the 
“neutral” range. This finding points to the importance of team 
identification in sports crisis communication research (Wann & 
Branscombe, 1993). Given that this study utilized true crises that 
affected a variety of teams and athletes, participants were likely not 
highly identified with all the organizations/athletes involved in the 
offending actions. Thus, the crises did not reach a level of personal 
relevance to participants that would lead them to more highly 
ranked levels of crisis responsibility. Therefore, this typology 
should be used to further examine the variable of fandom in crisis 
communication by examining fans’ evaluations of crises that fea-
ture the specific athlete or sporting organization with which they 
identify. Additionally, fandom might explain why the results of this 
study showed that the degree of correlation decreased as the level 
of responsibility increased. Future research should assess whether 
this relationship is also observed among highly-identified fans. 
Also, this study analyzes the organizational crisis responsibility 
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attributed to each of the 12 crisis types. Yet, sports crises are not 
simply experienced on an organizational level, as some crises pri-
marily result from and impact an individual’s actions. The rela-
tionship between the crisis typology clusters and the individual/
organizational nature of the crisis must be explored, especially in 
a sports setting. 
Limitations
This study is certainly not without its limitations. First, the 
researchers utilized a convenience sample of college students for 
the full administration of the survey. While this study still pro-
vides valuable findings, a convenience sample cannot yield gen-
eralizable results. As such, future research should examine this 
typology by utilizing a more generalizable sample. Furthermore, 
sports literature has also noted that men and women consume 
and enjoy sports differently (Raney, 2006). Given that this study’s 
sample skewed heavily female (n = 75%), future studies should 
obtain samples that allow for the examination of whether men 
and women evaluate crises in the resulting typology differently. 
This is especially necessary given the findings of K. A. Brown 
et al. (2015) that found that “race was a more predominant fac-
tor in the image repair process than gender” (p. 499). As such, 
potential racial differences should also be examined. In addition, 
in study 1, participants were encouraged to use their own defini-
tion of what constituted a crisis. While the authors conducted the 
resulting qualitative content analysis guided by Coombs’s (2012) 
definition, not providing participants with Coombs’s definition in 
the questionnaire could present a potential limitation. 
Conclusion
This study established a foundation for a sports-specific crisis 
typology, simplifying the lens through which crises will be evalu-
ated. In doing so, the number of potential crises that could impact 
a sporting organization was reduced from an initial list of 263 to 
12, greatly reducing the burden of the “pre-crisis” phase. This study 
also divided the 12 crisis types into three clusters (environmental/
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individual crises; rules and norms violations; and organizational 
mismanagement), reflecting the amount of organizational crisis 
responsibility that would be associated with each event. This prac-
tice will aid both scholars and practitioners in evaluating promi-
nent crises in sports.
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ABSTRACT
Effective communication about medical countermeasures—including drugs, devices, 
and biologics—is often critical in emergency situations. Such communication, how-
ever, does not just happen. It must be planned and prepared for. One mechanism to 
develop communication strategies is through the use of prospective scenarios, which 
allow readers the opportunity to rehearse responses while also weighing the implica-
tions of their actions. This article describes the development of such a scenario: The 
SPARS Pandemic 2025–2028. Steps in this process included deciding on a time frame, 
identifying likely critical uncertainties, and then using this framework to construct a 
storyline covering both the response and recovery phases of a fictional emergency 
event. Lessons learned from the scenario development and how the scenario can be 
used to improve communication are also discussed.
KEYWORDS: prospective scenario, medical countermeasures, risk communication, 
public health emergency, crisis communication 
Medical countermeasures (MCM)—including drugs, devices, 
and biologics (e.g., vaccines)—often play critical roles in curtail-
ing the impacts of natural disease outbreaks as well as chemical, 
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biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incidents (Courtney 
& Sadove, 2015). It is not uncommon for members of the public, 
however, to misuse or hesitate to take recommended MCM (Liu 
et al., 2017; Quinn et al., 2008; Steelfisher et al., 2011). New and 
unfamiliar technology, an accelerated regulatory approval process, 
or discordant expert views may heighten perceived risks of MCM, 
leading to public aversion to the countermeasure and/or dimin-
ished public trust in MCM regulators or recommenders (Belongia 
et al., 2005; Carlsen & Glenton, 2016; Henrich & Holmes, 2011). 
In other cases, strong feelings of vulnerability in an emergency sit-
uation may prompt persons to demand unnecessary MCM, pro-
test their lack of access to MCM with limited availability, and/or 
use an excessive amount of prescribed MCM (Dart et al., 2015; 
Durigon & Kosatsky, 2012; Whitcomb et al., 2015). In still other 
situations, certain social groups may have limited access to MCM 
because some institutions are still in the process of learning how 
culture, race, language, and citizenship status produce barriers to 
health information sharing (Lin et al., 2014; Uscher-Pines et al., 
2011). To mitigate all of these issues and ensure proper and timely 
use of MCM, good communication is key.
From 2014 to 2016, the Center for Health Security undertook 
a research project to catalog MCM communication “dilemmas” 
(in the broad sense of a problem) in emergency situations and 
provide practical and strategic recommendations on how better 
to obtain desired population health outcomes through improved 
communication. The principal product was a casebook featuring 
recent health crises (e.g., 2014–2015 West Africa Ebola outbreak 
and 2011 Fukushima nuclear plant accident) that helped to illus-
trate the principles and conditions for effective MCM communi-
cation (Schoch-Spana et al., 2016). 
Much of the practice-oriented literature relies upon real cri-
ses to illustrate successful (or failed) approaches to risk and crisis 
communication (e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion [CDC], 2018; Ulmer et al., 2017). The project team similarly 
used past health emergencies to advance understanding of how 
communication enables appropriate public use of MCMs, because 
case studies have compelling benefits for learning: People rea-
son effectively through analogy and not just abstract principles, 
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contextualization makes broader principles meaningful and mem-
orable, and cases promote reflective thinking and reinforce users’ 
abilities to apply that knowledge in novel settings (Allchin, 2013; 
Epling et al., 2003).
Leveraging the same didactic qualities as retrospective cases 
(Varum & Melo, 2010), the project team subsequently developed 
a fictionalized prospective scenario—The SPARS Pandemic 2025–
2028—to further prepare users for MCM-related risk and crisis 
communication dilemmas on the horizon. A scenario is an “ana-
lytically coherent” and “imaginatively engaging” story about a pos-
sible future state (Bishop et al., 2007) that spurs users to envision 
and exercise their role in shaping potential outcomes (Borjeson 
et al., 2006; Mahmoud et al., 2009; Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008). 
Outlined in this paper and available in full online (Schoch-Spana 
et al., 2017), the SPARS scenario is intended to help authorities 
better anticipate MCM emergency communication dilemmas, 
understand the larger contexts, practice effective responses, and 
develop acuity and agility for addressing unforeseen problems. 
The SPARS Pandemic 2025–2028 features MCM communication 
dilemmas both of the enduring and emerging kind—especially 
those in relation to evolving information and communication 
technologies (ICT).
Benefits of Scenarios and Simulations in Preparing for  
Disasters and Epidemics
The forward-looking SPARS scenario is a tool meant to prompt 
readers to imagine the dynamic and oftentimes conflicted circum-
stances in which MCM emergency communication takes place. By 
engaging readers with a rigorous, simulated health emergency the 
scenario provides opportunities for readers to mentally “rehearse” 
responses while also weighing the implications of their actions 
(Borjeson et al., 2006). Apart from testing out responses to fore-
seeable events, the scenario also provides readers opportunities 
to consider potential measures in today’s environment that might 
avert comparable problems or classes of problems in the future; 
that is, consider how to create a preferred future (Bishop et al., 
2007; Borjeson et al., 2006; Mahmoud et al., 2009; Wilkinson & 
Eidinow, 2008). 
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Producing coherent and imaginative narratives about the 
future to inform decision-making in the present is an approach to 
planning and risk management that businesses, think tanks, gov-
ernments, and non-governmental organizations have embraced 
for a half century or more, and a wide range of aims, applica-
tions, and techniques have evolved (Bishop et al., 2007; Varum 
& Melo, 2010; Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008). In the case of a low- 
probability high-consequence event like a pandemic or CBRN 
incident in which MCM may be deployed, scenario development 
provides a way—absent an actual emergency—for stakeholders to 
characterize specific impacts (based on the accepted science), cre-
ate a shared vision of the threat, weigh alternatives futures with or 
without risk-reducing interventions, and stimulate action (Earth-
quake Engineering Research Institute [EERI], 2019; Preuss & God-
frey, 2006). Earthquake and bioterrorism scenarios, for instance, 
have played important roles in motivating creative thinking about 
the need for novel policies and programs and in mobilizing new 
constituencies around seismic risk reduction (National Research 
Council [NRC], 2011) and public health emergency preparedness 
(Hamilton & Smith, 2006; O’Toole et al., 2002), respectively.
Scenarios that depict an unfolding crisis are valuable tools that 
can heighten awareness about complex hazards and also enable 
practical training for the management of disasters and epidemics 
through exercises (European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control [ECDC], 2014; Federal Emergency Management Agency 
[FEMA], 2019; World Health Organization [WHO], 2018). 
Discussion-based exercises (often called tabletop exercises) help 
participants, typically decision-makers, become more familiar 
with emergency plans and procedures, individual and organiza-
tional roles and responsibilities, and special challenges posed by 
a particular threat to public health and safety. By contrast, opera-
tion-based exercises (such as drills, functional exercises, and field 
exercises) attempt to incorporate, to a lesser or greater degree, the 
front-line personnel, equipment, and physical spaces expected to 
be in play during an actual emergency (FEMA, 2019; Skryabina 
et al., 2017). A majority of studies on the effectiveness of train-
ing in emergency risk communication, in particular, conclude 
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that the impacts of tabletop exercises and simulation for training 
include enhanced awareness, readiness, and knowledge (Miller 
et al., 2017). 
Social Media Challenges/Opportunities for Health and MCM 
Communication
Like the previously mentioned earthquake and bioterrorism sce-
narios, the SPARS scenario is meant to prepare risk and crisis 
communicators for future emergencies, and in particular the com-
plex conditions that rapidly-evolving ICT, including social media, 
are now generating around medicine/public health generally and 
MCM specifically. 
ICT use, including text, illustrations, photo, audio, videos, and 
diagrams communicated through blog posts, instant messages, 
video chats, and social network platforms, is now widespread and 
often used for health-related activities. Among members of the 
public, a 2010 survey by the Pew Research Center, for instance, 
showed that 8 in 10 internet users look online for health infor-
mation, making it the third most popular online activity in the 
U.S. (Fox, 2011). Likewise, practitioners, public health officials, 
and other health experts are increasingly turning to ICT—which 
provides a means to reach the broadest possible population in the 
fastest, easiest, and least expensive manner (Hinton & Hjorth, 
2013)—for a variety of purposes. Clinician-to-patient and peer-
to-peer communication, investing individual patients in their own 
care, information exchanges among diverse healthcare and pub-
lic health stakeholders, and detecting and managing disease out-
breaks have been transformed through ITC (Charles-Smith et al., 
2015; Grajales et al., 2014; Kreps & Neuhauser, 2010; Rice & Sara, 
2018). While this situation may appear overwhelmingly positive, 
some aspects of ITC use and its popularity remain problematic.
First, ITC use has altered the dynamics between health experts 
and the patients and populations they serve (Hawn, 2009). Social 
media in particular has provided a mechanism for laypersons to 
readily share their health-related experiential knowledge with 
each other, thus dislodging the centrality of health professionals’ 
authoritative knowledge in people’s decision-making and behavior 
(Hawn, 2009; Househ et al., 2014).
76 BRUNSON, CHANDLER, GRONVALL, RAVI, SELL, SHEARER, and SCHOCH-SPANA
Second, ITC can, and is, used to spread false information. 
Wolfe and associates (2002), for example, found that 32% of anti- 
vaccine websites surveyed included pictures of “menacing needles” 
and 23% had pictures of children reported to have been harmed or 
killed by vaccines. As parents come across these images and their 
associated stories this can lead parents to place greater emphasis 
on personal and emotional experience rather than scientific evi-
dence. Referred to as false consensus bias in the social psychology 
literature, parents may then hesitate to vaccinate or reject vaccines 
for their children altogether. 
What is particularly challenging in regard to social media is 
that such images and negative stories tend to have a greater impact 
than facts and positive messages. In their research of vaccination- 
related YouTube videos, for example, Keelan and associates (2007) 
found that while the majority (48%) of the 153 identified vid-
eos promoted vaccination and only 32% were negative toward 
vaccination, the most liked and viewed were the ones with neg-
ative content. The lowest rated and watched videos were pro- 
vaccination public service announcements.
These positive and negative aspects of ITC, in turn, influence 
what practitioners and the broader public understand about MCM 
safety and efficacy, thus presenting new challenges and opportuni-
ties for crisis and risk communicators. Medication users, for exam-
ple, are increasingly sharing personal knowledge and experience 
of drug benefits and risks via online disease support networks, 
patient and drug forums, and microblogging (Matsuda, 2017; 
Sloane et al., 2015). Through social media, these individuals can 
find both practical information and a sense of community, while 
drug safety professionals have a new, rich data source with which 
to mine for potential evidence of adverse events, supplementing 
uneven healthcare provider reports (Edwards & Lindquist, 2011; 
Inch et al., 2012). 
At the same time, great potential exists for the public to 
encounter misleading or dangerous information about pharma-
ceuticals, as non-expert consumers deliver their own drug product 
testimonials and illegal online pharmacies promote their services 
via social media (Tyrawski & DeAndrea, 2015). Misinformation is 
proving especially challenging in connection with vaccines where 
The SPARS Pandemic 2025–2028 77
social media users encounter disproportionate negative reporting 
and images, are more swayed by personal narratives about vacci-
nation’s adverse effects than the science, and tend to judge dispa-
rate ideas about vaccines as equally valid, regardless of expertise 
(Guidry et al., 2015; Kata, 2012; Poland et al., 2009; Witteman & 
Zikmund-Fisher, 2012). Thus, in this current ITC-rich environ-
ment, good communication, and good training for effective com-
munication, is critical.
Methods
To develop the SPARS scenario a project team with expertise in a 
variety of areas, including epidemiology, public health prepared-
ness, risk communication, and the biological and social sciences, 
was assembled. Utilizing these diverse perspectives, the team used 
a combination of the inductive and deductive heuristics delineated 
by Ogilvy and Schwartz (2004) to develop the scenario premise 
(Figure 1). This process began with selecting the timeframe for the 
scenario—the years 2025–2028. These dates, which were 10–13 
years in the future at the time, were chosen to provide a timeline 
that allowed the development of future possibilities, but was not 
so far in the future as to make the scenario become a work of sci-
ence fiction. After the timeframe was established, the project team 
turned to the focal question: What emergency communication 
issues around MCM are most likely to exist 10 years from now?
To begin answering this question, the project team consid-
ered the key economic, environmental, political, social, and tech-
nological factors they felt were likely to emerge by 2025. Factors 
considered by the project team included prominent ones such as 
technological advances like the proliferation of tools to access the 
internet, increased use of the internet for things like social media 
and telemedicine, greater political and social polarizations, chang-
ing demographics in the United States including an aging baby 
boomer population, and climate change and urbanization that 
could result in the (re)emergence of zoonotic diseases. 
After careful discussion of each of these factors, which included 
consideration of existing literature and theoretical approaches, the 
team considered which factors seemed inevitable given present 
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FIGURE 1 The scenario generation process, adapted from Ogilvy and 
Schwartz (2004).
#1 - Identify focal issue and 
time frame
#2 - Brainstorm a list of "key 
drivers"
#3 - Sort "drivers" into 
"predetermined trends" and 
"critical uncertainties"
#4 - Select top 2 "critical 
uncertainties" and build 2x2 
scenario matrix
#5 - Select 1 of the 4 futures 
and elaborate on a complete 
storyline
Deepen the plot through 
systems thinking
Tell a story with a beginning, 
middle, and end
Create characters
Employ standard plot lines
# 6 - Rene the plot through an 
iterative process of reection, 
research, and revision
#7 - Explore the strategic 
implications of the scenario
Single out a key decision or a strategic 
uncertainty that has long-range consequences 
important to the organization
Consider notable forces shaping and 
inuencing the focal issue: social, 
technological, economic, natural, political
Distinguish inevitable trends that will play out 
the same no matter what *versus* important 
trends whose impacts are unsure
Reduce each critical uncertainty to an axis 
with polar cases at each extremity; overlay 
the 2 axes and produce 4 futures to explore
Think of critical events, then delve into under-
lying patterns and structures that these events 
signal; use diagrams to see how forces interact
Capture time and causality dimensions; rst 
this, then that; generate a series of headlines 
describing events over the course of the scenario
Personify the magnitude and direction of 
change by using real or iconic gues
Build on common narratives ("winners and 
losers" and "David and Goliath")
Return to initial focal issue to determine 
gaps, vulnerabilities, options facing the 
organization
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conditions and which were the most likely to impact the direction 
of the scenario. From this process, two critical uncertainties were 
identified: the extent of access to information technology, that the 
team felt was inevitable, and the degree of fragmentation among 
populations along social, political, religious, and cultural lines, 
which the team felt would lead to novel communication issues. The 
project team then used these uncertainties to construct a scenario 
matrix illustrating the four possible futures that could be shaped 
by these trends (Figure 2). After careful consideration, the team 
ultimately chose the “echo-chamber”—a world comprised of iso-
lated and highly fragmented communities with widespread access 
to information technology—as the future in which the prospective 
scenario would take place.
FIGURE 2 Final Scenario Framework: Four possible futures in which the 
SPARS pandemic unfolds.
Unbridled access and openness to information technology (including social 
media)
Isolated 
communities, 
social 
fragmentation
“Echo-chamber” “UN Security 
Council”
Diverse but 
integrated 
communities, 
“melting pot”
“Solitary 
Confinement”
“Shangri-La”
Erratic, unequal access to information technology (including social media)
“Echo-Chamber”—a technologically savvy, plugged in, but fragmented 
society in which groups that hold diverse worldviews consume information 
that continues to validate their own positions, allowing them to live in their 
own mental bubble; government agencies and citizens alike have ready 
access to all the latest informational tools.
“Solitary Confinement”—a society (including general population and public 
sector) with an uneven access to informational technology (due to lack 
of net neutrality, uneven infrastructure) that isolates differently minded 
communities.
“UN Security Council”—a technologically savvy, plugged in society where 
diversity reigns, but difference and tolerance are socially valued, and where 
information flows freely across different groups.
“Singapore”—a melting pot society, with peaceful co-existence of differently 
minded groups, but uneven levels of access to information technology.
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From this point, scenario-specific storylines were developed, 
drawing on the subject matter expertise of the project group, 
interviews with expert working group (EWG) members associated 
with the larger project, historical accounts of past MCM crises, 
contemporary media reports, and scholarly literature in sociology, 
emergency preparedness, health education, and risk communica-
tion. This process allowed the project team to identify expected 
and new communication dilemmas to include in the scenario. As 
one example of this, the project team considered how the internet 
and social media affect the social dynamics of health communica-
tion. Using the theory of false consensus bias and the findings on 
vaccination in social media (described previously in the literature 
review section), the project team identified specific communica-
tion dilemmas to include in the scenario. One of these involved 
responding to a particularly emotional video that was widely 
spread via social media and then maintained in the public view for 
months afterward by teenagers who enjoyed the shock value of the 
images. This specific case, titled “Going Viral,” is presented later in 
this paper.
Once different dilemmas were identified, the team considered 
how the different storylines could reasonably fit together and what 
characters were necessary in order for these events to occur. An 
outline for the scenario was then constructed using newspaper 
and other social media headlines as markers for key events; in 
many instances, these remained in the scenario in order to intro-
duce the different dilemmas. Finally, the entire storyline was writ-
ten in draft form as if the SPARS outbreak had occurred in the 
recent past, allowing some outcomes and conclusions to be drawn 
within the scenario.
From this point, scenario development entailed a recursive 
process of continued research and analysis by the project team, 
review and feedback from EWG members (summer 2015), and 
two rounds of external review by authorities on risk communica-
tion and the MCM enterprise (four individuals in fall 2015, three 
individuals in summer 2017). Comprising the project EWG were 
risk and crisis communication scholars; MCM developers, pro-
ducers, and regulators; practitioners in medicine, public health, 
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and pharmacy science; and experienced public health emergency 
managers at all levels of government. Revisions were made after 
each review in order to increase the accuracy and usefulness of the 
material presented in the scenario. 
The final product, referred to hereafter as the SPARS scenario, 
is not intended to be a crystal ball of things to come; rather, it is 
meant to serve as a plausible narrative that illustrates a broad range 
of serious and frequently encountered challenges in the realm of 
risk and crisis communication. To increase the usefulness of the 
scenario, each response- and recovery-phase dilemma is followed 
by food for thought questions that are meant to prompt readers, 
reading as individuals or in training groups, to consider how they 
might respond to similar situations or how they might prevent 
similar problems or classes of problems from occurring in the first 
place. Like the studies of scenario-driven exercises (Skryabina et 
al., 2017) show, including those featuring emergency risk commu-
nication (Miller et al., 2017), the SPARS scenario is intended to 
prepare users for mitigating public health emergencies and man-
aging MCM communication dilemmas more effectively. In the 
following sections, we outline the scenario environment and how 
the fictional outbreak begins. We then provide excerpts of two 
dilemma sections as examples of the larger document. 
The SPARS Scenario: An Introduction
Scenario Environment
The setting of SPARS is the world in 2025–2028. For this time 
period, the project team imagined a world that is simultaneously 
more connected and yet more divided. There is nearly univer-
sal access to wireless internet for even the poorest persons in the 
United States. Additionally, technological innovations and com-
petition between technology companies have made an even wider 
range of information technology readily available to all. Despite 
the possibilities for these advancements to facilitate broad commu-
nication between individuals and communities, the project team 
also envisioned a future where many have chosen to self-restrict 
the sources they seek for information, often electing to interact 
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only with those whom they agree with on significant issues. This 
trend increasingly isolates cliques from one another, making com-
munication across and between these groups more difficult.
In relation to MCM communication more specifically, gov-
ernment agencies like the CDC have increasingly adopted social 
media technologies, including long-existing platforms such as 
Facebook, Snapchat, and Twitter, as well as emerging platforms 
like ZapQ—an interface that enables users to aggregate and 
archive media content from other platforms and communicate 
with cloud-based social groups based on common interests and 
current events. Federal and state public health organizations have 
also developed agency-specific applications and ramped up efforts 
to maintain and update agency websites. 
Challenging this technological grip, however, are the diversity 
of new platforms and the speed with which social media commu-
nities evolve. Moreover, while technologically savvy and capable, 
these agencies still lag in terms of their “multilingual” skills, cul-
tural competence, and ability to be present on all forms of social 
media. These agencies also face budget constraints, which com-
plicates their efforts to improve public communications efficiency 
and effectiveness by increasing their presence in existing and 
emerging social media platforms.
SPARS
After much consideration of possible emergency situations that 
would require MCM use, the project team decided on setting the 
storyline around a novel coronavirus that caused a mild, flu-like 
disease in most instances, but pneumonia and/or hypoxia requir-
ing hospitalization and extensive medical treatment in a small 
minority of cases. The project team named this fictional pathogen 
the St. Paul Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus, or SPARS 
for short, because in the scenario it is first identified in St. Paul, 
Minnesota.
Two features of this disease are important to note because they 
impact how the storyline of the scenario plays out, as well as some 
of the communication dilemmas that occur. First, the project 
team decided to make SPARS have an extended incubation period 
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(7 to 10 days) but a short latent period (4 to 5 days). This compli-
cates the scenario because infected persons in the story are capable 
of spreading the virus for up to 6 days before showing symptoms 
of the disease themselves. This feature of SPARS makes isolation 
procedures in the scenario, like urging people to stay home if 
they think they might be sick, less effective than what is typically 
expected for airborne pathogens and thus introduces novel dilem-
mas in the storyline. Second, the project team decided to make the 
morbidity and mortality from SPARS both significantly higher in 
children than adults, and among pregnant women and those with 
chronic respiratory conditions. This parallels disease characteris-
tics associated with past disease outbreaks, including the H1N1 
pandemic, and allowed for some communication dilemmas from 
the past to be revisited under different future circumstances.
In all, the SPARS scenario provides 19 specific storylines, and 
an associated 23 communication dilemmas for readers to consider. 
An outline of the entire storyline is available in Table 1, and a list 
of the communication dilemmas provided in the scenario can be 
found in Table 2. The following sections provide excerpts of two 
dilemmas included in the scenario as well as their associated com-
munication dilemmas and food for thought questions. 
TABLE 1  Timeline of Events in the “SPARS Pandemic 2025–2028”  
Scenario
2025
October   The first US deaths occurred due to SPARS. Initially, these 
deaths were thought to have been caused by influenza.
November  Cases of SPARS were reported across Minnesota and in six 
other states.
  Thanksgiving holiday travel and Black Friday shopping 
facilitated spread of SPARS beyond the Midwest (26 states 
and multiple other countries by mid-December).
  The WHO declared the SPARS pandemic to be a Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern.
December  No treatment or vaccine for SPARS existed, but there was 
some evidence that the antiviral Kalocivir could be effective 
as a therapeutic.
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  A proprietary vaccine developed and manufactured by a 
multinational livestock conglomerate (GMI) was proposed 
as a potential foundation for a human vaccine. The vaccine 
was developed to combat an outbreak of a similar respiratory 
coronavirus in hooved mammal populations in Southeast 
Asia, but the vaccine had not been licensed by any regulatory 
authority or tested in humans. There were concerns over 
potential side effects.
2026
January  The US government contracted CynBio to develop and 
produce a human SPARS vaccine based on the GMI animal 
vaccine.
  The HHS Secretary invoked the Public Readiness and 
Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) to provide liability 
protection for the vaccine manufacturer and providers. 
Congress authorized and appropriated emergency funds 
under the PREP Act to provide compensation for potential 
adverse side effects from the vaccine.
  Following reports of Kalocivir’s limited success in treating 
patients with severe SPARS infections, the FDA issued an 
Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for the antiviral. Kalocivir 
had been evaluated as a therapeutic for SARS and MERS, 
and several million doses were maintained in the SNS, which 
could be deployed as necessary while production capacity 
was established to meet demand.
  The FDA, CDC, and NIH provided seemingly conflicting 
communications regarding the safety and efficacy of 
Kalocivir.
  In the United States, public anxiety around SPARS resulted in 
extensive use of Kalocivir, frequent self-reporting of SPARS 
symptoms, and a surge in demand for medical care.
  By late January SPARS was detected in 42 countries and all US 
states. 
February  A lack of cultural competency in FDA and other 
governmental communication became apparent among 
various ethnic groups in the United States.
  A video of a 3-year-old vomiting and fainting after taking 
a dose of Kalocivir was widely and rapidly spread via social 
media, strengthening opposition to the EUA.
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  The UK Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory 
Agency and the European Medicines Agency jointly 
authorized the emergency use of a new antiviral, VMax, in the 
United Kingdom and throughout the European Union. Some 
Americans attempted to gain access to VMax online or by 
traveling to Europe.
April  The CDC publicized an updated (and significantly lower) case 
fatality rate in the United States; the perception of lesser risk 
triggered a drop in public interest.
May  Production of Corovax, the SPARS vaccine produced by 
CynBio, was well underway.
  Federal agencies initiated a communications campaign using 
well-known public figures with mixed results. Polls indicated 
a 15–23% increase in SPARS and Kalocivir knowledge 
nationwide. Hip-hop icon BZee had success promoting 
public health messaging with an online video clip, but he 
lost credibility when he compared volunteers for Corovax 
trials with “volunteers” from the Tuskegee syphilis study. 
Similarly, former President Bennett provided a non-committal 
response when asked if she would want Kalocivir for her new 
grandson.
  Public health agencies discovered that a relatively new social 
media platform, UNEQL, was being used as a primary means 
of communication in college-aged populations. 
June  Corovax entered the final stage of its expedited review, and 
production capacity was increased. Ten million doses were 
expected to be available by July with fifty million more in 
August.
  The CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice 
(ACIP) announced vaccine priority groups. Healthcare 
providers were not included as a priority, inciting protests by 
doctors and nurses across the country.
  In order to prioritize distribution of limited Corovax supply, 
the federal government requested that states report 
summary information for patient electronic health records 
(EHRs) to estimate the number of individuals in high-risk 
populations. This effort was met with resistance from the 
public, who protested the federal government accessing their 
private medical information.
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July  A week prior to initiating the nationwide vaccination 
program, damage to a power grid in the Pacific Northwest 
resulted in a widespread power outage that lasted two 
weeks. State and local public health agencies initiated 
communications programs using posters and flyers to 
promote the vaccination program in the absence of 
electronic media.
  Social media efforts across the country promoted the 
vaccination campaign, and crowdsourced data helped to 
increase efficiency in distributing the vaccine.
August  The Corovax vaccination program met resistance from several 
groups: alternative medicine proponents, Muslims, African 
Americans, and anti-vaccination activists. Initially operating 
independently, these groups banded together via social 
media to increase their influence.
September  Japan announced that it would not approve Corovax for 
use in Japan in favor of developing and producing its own 
vaccine.
October  College students predominantly on the East and West coasts 
staged protests against the unequal global availability of 
Corovax. Vaccination rates among these students were below 
average for college students in other areas of the country.
November  The anti-anti-vaccine movement, formed in the wake of the 
2015 measles outbreak in the United States, reignited their 
efforts to combat the anti-vaccination super-group. The 
FDA, CDC, and other federal agencies also redoubled their 
communications efforts to promote the Corovax campaign.
  An increasing number of post-SPARS pneumonia cases were 
reported across the country.
December  The nationwide vaccination program was expanded beyond 
the initial priority populations to include the rest of the 
country.
  Federal agencies initiated a vaccination communication 
program involving targeted online advertisements.
2027
February  Post-SPARS pneumonia cases stressed inventories of 
antibiotics across the country. The HHS Secretary authorized 
distribution of the oldest lots of antibiotics from the SNS to 
supplement the antibiotic supply nationwide.
  Tests of antibiotics in the SNS inventory determined that 94% 
of the remaining antibiotics in the oldest lots maintained
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  sufficient potency. Tests conducted in August 2026 provided 
the basis for extending the expiration of these lots from 2027 
to 2029. 
March  Rumors spread via traditional and social media that the 
government was dispensing expired antibiotics.
  Alyssa Karpowitz, a leader in the natural medicine movement, 
sought medical care at an emergency department after 
natural remedies failed to resolve her son’s bacterial 
pneumonia. After successful treatment with proper 
antibiotics from the SNS supply, she touted the benefits of 
“expired” antibiotics in her social media circles.
April  Crowd-sourced and independent epidemiology analysis of 
Corovax side effects conflicted with official federal reports. 
The independent analyses gained popularity in traditional 
and social media due to visual presentation and interactive 
content. Government attempts to respond with data and 
press releases largely failed.
May  Reports of Corovax side effects began to gain traction. Several 
parents of children who experienced neurological symptoms 
after receiving the vaccination sued the federal government 
and CynBio. The lawsuit was dropped when they learned of 
compensation funds available through the PREP Act and the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund.
November  Initial reports of long-term side effects of the Corovax 
vaccine emerged. These reports arose primarily from those 
in the initial priority (high-risk) populations and were few 
in number. With little available data and numerous pre-
existing conditions, initial studies were unable to identify a 
statistically significant association with any long-term effects. 
Claims for compensation were placed on indefinite hold until 
further data could be gathered and analysis completed.
  In response to public demand for long-term side effect 
compensation, the HHS Secretary invited Congress to 
conduct an independent investigation of the federal 
compensation process to alleviate concerns of impropriety.
  The public and media pressured Congress to increase the 
funds authorized for compensation under the PREP Act.
2028
August  The SPARS pandemic was officially declared to be over; 
however, experts remain concerned about domestic animal 
reservoirs and the potential for future outbreaks.
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TABLE 2  Emergency Communication Dilemmas Featured in the “SPARS 
Pandemic 2025–2028” Scenario
Response Phase
 ▶ Engendering public trust and a sense of self-efficacy when a crisis is still 
evolving and critical health information is incomplete
 ▶ Responding to public and political pressure to share information about 
potential MCMs in the development pipeline even though information 
may be incomplete or proprietary
 ▶ Maintaining trust in government processes for ensuring the timely 
development of safe and effective vaccines when novel threats arise
 ▶ Harmonizing inconsistent messaging across health agencies
 ▶ Appropriately tailoring public health messages to address the concerns 
and culture of specific communities 
 ▶ Responding to the power of graphic images of a child in distress: one 
story that is elevated to a population-level problem
 ▶ Responding to demand for an alternative antiviral drug not available in 
the United States
 ▶ Responding to misinformation or doubt about an MCM generated by a 
prominent public figure
 ▶ Overlooking communication platforms used by specific groups; quickly 
gaining fluency and effectively engaging the public using a new media 
platform
 ▶ Responding to public criticism about potential unequal access to MCMs 
like Kalocivir
 ▶ Maintaining public support after changing positions on MCM safety and 
efficacy 
 ▶ Communicating the need for and reasoning behind the prioritization of 
scarce resources
 ▶ Publicizing MCM programs and availability to promote uptake and 
efficient distribution
 ▶ Providing real-time data on vaccine availability to align MCM supply with 
public demand 
 ▶ Maintaining consistent messaging across electronic and non-electronic 
media and implementing a secondary communications plan if electronic 
media are not available
 ▶ Addressing multiple independent MCM concerns simultaneously
 ▶ Meeting the information needs of citizens who come from diverse 
cultural, social, and demographic backgrounds and who may have 
varying degrees of trust in health authorities
 ▶ Supporting the current MCM product in the face of opposition from a 
foreign regulatory agency
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 ▶ Responding to complex ethical issues that are beyond the United States 
government’s control
 ▶ Responding to questions regarding safety and efficacy of drugs that have 
extended shelf lives
Recovery Phase
 ▶ Communicating with the public about trustworthy sources of data and 
options for legal recourse in a climate of mistrust
 ▶ Bringing a sense of resolution to a period of crisis while striking a balance 
between the need to affirm collective grief/loss and the need to move 
forward
 ▶ Institutionalizing communications lessons from the 2025–2028 SPARS 
pandemic
Response Scenario Excerpt 
The following excerpt from the scenario takes place early on 
in the pandemic. One month previously the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) had issued an Emergency Use Authorization 
(EUA) for the antiviral Kalocivir. The drug had been evaluated as 
a therapeutic for other coronavirus-caused diseases and several 
million doses were maintained by the Strategic National Stockpile 
(SNS), which meant the drug could be deployed as necessary while 
production capacity was established to meet demand. The FDA 
and CDC provided information on the drug, but some differ-
ences in their messaging caused concern among certain groups 
including parents of young children. The specific communication 
dilemma this excerpt considers is how to confront the power of a 
single graphic image of a child in distress when one story is ele-
vated to a population-level problem. 
“Going Viral”
Reports of negative side effects associated with Kalocivir began 
gaining traction in February 2026. Despite the negative response, 
public health agencies continued to make forward progress until 
February 22, when a video of a 3-year-old boy in North Carolina 
projectile vomiting immediately after taking a dose of Kalocivir 
went viral. In the video clip, the boy swallows a pediatric dose of 
liquid Kalocivir, vomits profusely, chokes, and then faints in the 
pool of his own vomit while his mother shrieks in the background. 
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This clip was widely shared across the United States with a 
variety of captions including #AntiviralsDontWork, #DontTake 
TheDrugs, and #NaturalCuresAreBetterThanThis. The hashtags, 
in turn, provided a way for people sharing these views to find one 
another and band together on social media. They formed ZapQ 
and other online discussion groups, which allowed them to receive 
any messages from group members via smartphones and internet 
accessing technology (IAT) instantaneously as they were posted. 
Some members of these ZapQ groups even began to use full-sized 
(12"×12") IAT screens on the backs of their jackets, coats, and 
backpacks to loop the vomiting video for all in their immediate 
vicinity to see.
The social media groundswell quickly overwhelmed the capac-
ity of local, state, and federal agencies to respond, and compliance 
with public health and medical recommendations dropped consid-
erably. The FDA and other government agencies quickly attempted 
to remind the public that correlation does not equate to causation, 
and that vomiting was not a known side effect of Kalocivir. This 
message, while scientifically accurate, lacked appropriate empathy 
and failed to assuage the public’s mounting fears. As a result, it was 
largely ignored, and public concern continued to grow.
In the following weeks, officials from the FDA, CDC, and 
other government organizations attempted to promote positive, 
accurate information about Kalocivir on several traditional and 
social media platforms in order to quell public fear. This messag-
ing, however, was less than optimal both in terms of timing and 
dissemination. While the government took several days to provide 
an emotionally appropriate message, the spread of the viral video 
on social media was exponentially faster. By the time the govern-
ment responded, most people across the country had already seen 
the vomiting video and formed their own conclusions. Addition-
ally, in their responses, governmental organizations were not able 
to effectively access all social media platforms. ZapQ groups, for 
example, had closed memberships and typically could only be 
accessed via invitations from group members. 
Both of these issues prompted government organizations to 
improve the timing and impact of their social media responses. 
While most government agencies, including the CDC and HHS, 
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had long-established offices that were directed to coordinate social 
media and other communication efforts, the protocols of indi-
vidual agencies and different agency cultures led to delayed and 
sometimes uncoordinated messages.
Despite the many outreach efforts by various government 
officials and entities, the government was ultimately unable to 
develop a suitable replacement for the initial vomiting video. By 
early June 2026, the video had become the most shared Zap clip 
among junior high and high school students across the country 
who appreciated the shock factor of the video. As a result, the pub-
lic was continually re-exposed to the anti-Kalocivir message for 
several months after the initial incident and subsequent responses.
Food for Thought Questions:
1. Why might communicating the science around MCM adverse 
effects alone not be enough to address people’s fears and con-
cerns about an MCM like Kalocivir? Why is it also important 
to communicate with compassion, concern, and empathy?
2. To what extent is having sufficiently skilled staff and organi-
zational capacity to communicate via traditional media and 
social media platforms critical to influencing public debates 
and awareness about an MCM like Kalocivir?
3. What MCM communication challenges are likely to emerge 
among up-and-coming youth audiences who are avid consum-
ers of interactive and visual forms of information?
Recovery Scenario Excerpt
The following excerpt from the scenario considers issues related 
with recovery, and how to communicate with the public about 
trustworthy sources of data and options for legal recourse in a cli-
mate of mistrust. At this point in the storyline, Corovax, the FDA-
approved vaccine for SPARS, has been released for more than 
9 months and the United States is solidly in the recovery phase 
of the pandemic. SPARS is now uncommon in the US and public 
focus has shifted from the disease to the potential side effects of 
SPARS treatments including the Corovax vaccine.
92 BRUNSON, CHANDLER, GRONVALL, RAVI, SELL, SHEARER, and SCHOCH-SPANA
“Vaccine Injury”
As time passed and more people across the United States were 
vaccinated, claims of adverse side effects began to emerge. Several 
parents claimed that their children were experiencing neurolog-
ical symptoms similar to those seen among livestock exposed to 
the GMI vaccine. By May 2027, parental anxiety around this claim 
had intensified to the point of lawsuits. That month, a group of 
parents whose children developed mental retardation as a result of 
encephalitis in the wake of Corovax vaccination sued the federal 
government, demanding removal of the liability shield protecting 
the pharmaceutical companies responsible for developing and 
manufacturing Corovax. 
The growing plaintiff cohort quickly withdrew their suit upon 
learning that the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust 
Fund (NVICTF) and an emergency appropriation of funds autho-
rized by Congress under the PREP Act existed to provide financial 
reimbursement to those who were adversely affected by the Cor-
ovax vaccine in order to cover healthcare costs and other related 
expenses. Given the positive reaction to the federal government’s 
response and the fact that the majority of US citizens willing to 
be vaccinated had already been immunized, the negative publicity 
surrounding adverse reactions had little effect on nationwide vac-
cination rates. The focus on adverse side effects, however, resulted 
in a considerable increase in the number of compensation claims 
filed, and many grew concerned about the long-term effects that 
Corovax could have on their health. This concern was particularly 
high among some African American parents who continued to 
question the government’s motives regarding the Corovax vacci-
nation campaign.
While the FDA, CDC, and other agencies were busy research-
ing possible connections between Corovax and the reported neu-
rological side effects, their efforts were continually undermined by 
epidemiological analyses produced by various non-governmental 
individuals and groups. The popular science blogger EpiGirl, for 
example, began posting interactive maps of the incidence of Cor-
ovax side effects in April 2027. To create the maps, EpiGirl col-
lected anecdotes of adverse Corovax side effects using Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube and combined them with data downloaded 
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from the HHS Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), 
a national vaccine safety surveillance program maintained by the 
CDC and FDA. EpiGirl also encouraged those among her sub-
scribers who were Apple product users to share health data with 
her via Apple’s ResearchKit and HealthKit applications. EpiGirl’s 
maps were consequently shared widely in social media circles and 
even included in local and national news reports.
The federal government became concerned about the validity 
of EpiGirl’s anecdotal data and the widespread sharing of patient 
information via the internet. EpiGirl’s data showed a significantly 
higher incidence rate of nearly every reported side effect; how-
ever, federal officials believed that this was largely due to dupli-
cate entries resulting from compiling data from multiple sources. 
Additionally, EpiGirl’s data did not seek to address the cause of the 
reported side effects, only the incidence rate. Publication of sim-
ilar results from organizations such as Patients-Like-Me, a group 
closely associated with the natural medicine movement, further 
legitimized these independent reports. The government attempted 
to respond to these claims through formal press releases, but these 
were neither as visually appealing nor as interactive as EpiGirl’s 
maps and were, therefore, largely ignored.
Food for Thought Questions:
1. How might advance development and testing of recovery mes-
sages that specifically address the topics of adverse side effects 
and the NVICTF help improve health authorities’ ability to 
respond to public distress about medical issues emerging after 
an MCM campaign? What are some messages that would war-
rant such testing?
2. Despite the uncertain science about the link between Coravax 
and the reported neurological symptoms, why should health 
officials still communicate with compassion and genuine sym-
pathy toward those in the vaccinated population who experi-
ence medical issues subsequent to being vaccinated? 
3. Given growing interest in open data systems and the appli-
cation of “crowd sourcing” to solve complex problems, how 
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might public health officials take greater advantage of two-way 
communication with an interested public in the aftermath of 
the SPARS outbreak? For instance, how might input and anal-
ysis from members of the public help improve adverse event 
monitoring or assess the strengths and weaknesses of a specific 
MCM campaign? 
Crafting Scenarios: Lessons Learned
Creating the scenario described above was a months-long process 
that involved many iterative steps. While the basic process of sce-
nario development is both described above and detailed by others 
including Ogilvy and Schwartz (2004), the following are offered as 
lessons learned in order to assist in the development and design of 
scenarios in the future:
 ▶ Having a project team with different academic backgrounds 
(i.e., medicine, public health, and the social sciences) provided 
a solid foundation for developing the premise of the future in 
which the scenario would take place. Different perspectives, 
disagreements, and even lively debates were essential to devel-
oping a premise that was both realistic and meaningful. This 
process also provided forward momentum for the develop-
ment of specific storylines.
 ▶ Storyboarding the timeline of events was important to main-
taining coherency in the project. In the development of the 
SPARS scenario, storyboarding was not a one-time process but 
rather an ongoing exercise that occurred throughout scenario 
development.
 ▶ As storyboarding was occurring, it was essential to keep in 
mind the audiences for the project. In several cases, lessons 
specific audiences needed to walk away with were the starting 
point; the project team used these to work backward to make 
sure those lessons were fully incorporated into the storyline.
 ▶ A focus on small details, including using supporting illustra-
tions like newspaper and social media headlines, was neces-
sary to make the scenario as realistic as possible. This process 
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of “sweating the small stuff ” also provided a mechanism for 
the project team to check and recheck the accuracy of the over-
all product.
 ▶ Vetting the scenario with a group of subject matter experts 
was critical. In the SPARS scenario, this process helped iden-
tify dilemmas that were of particular relevance to specific 
target audiences as well as detect plot holes and inaccuracies 
that were necessary to fix in order for the storyline to be both 
believable and useful.
 ▶ Finally, developing facilitator guides along with the scenario 
was a way to increase the facility of the scenario as a teaching 
tool.
Conclusion
Effective communication about medical countermeasures—
including drugs, devices, and biologics (e.g., vaccines)—is often 
critical in emergency situations. Such communication, how-
ever, does not just happen. It must be planned and prepared for. 
Prospective scenarios, like the SPARS scenario described in this 
paper, offer important opportunities for communication planning 
and preparation by enabling readers, both individually and in 
discussion with others, to rehearse responses to communication 
dilemmas; encouraging readers to envision what the next gener-
ation of best practices in MCM emergency communication may 
entail, given technological and social trends such as the growing 
influence of social media and increasing levels of social isolation; 
and prompting readers to consider and prepare for other future 
communication dilemma possibilities. In today’s world of rapidly- 
evolving ICT, such preparation is especially crucial. 
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the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) because it 
would allow for the identification of the graduate student com-
plainants. The Kentucky Attorney General sided with the Kernel 
and ordered the release of the name-redacted records. To appeal 
the ruling, the University sued the paper. In the announcement 
of the lawsuit, University President Eli Capilouto acknowledged 
the tension of “safeguarding” survivors’ privacy while recognizing 
“the need for transparency” (Capilouto, 2016a, para. 1). The Kernel 
staff claimed the University was more concerned with protecting 
its reputation than its students (Editorial Board, 2016a, 2016b). 
Like any organization, institutions of higher education are sus-
ceptible to crises, and “higher education leaders face the added 
challenge of addressing potential gaps that a crisis may reveal rel-
ative to the core values of an institution” (Fortunato et al., 2018, 
p. 510). University communicators must protect reputations and 
stakeholder relationships (Varma, 2011). Many institutions, such 
as the University of Kentucky, are also public entities. Thus, the 
crisis can also affect relationships with government agencies and 
create an expectation that because it is a public institution, it must 
be held to a higher standard (Len-Ríos, 2010).
Despite the recent emergence of crisis communication studies 
in sexual misconduct cases on college campuses, Madden (2018) 
proclaimed that little research offers guidance for how communi-
cators “can most effectively deal with the gendered and emotional 
dimensions” of these issues (p. 596). Survivors cite privacy and 
confidentiality concerns as reasons why they choose not to report 
incidents (Trades Union Congress [TUC], 2016). The calls for 
confidentiality in sexual misconduct cases, which often include a 
male perpetrator in a position of power victimizing a female, point 
to the notion that privacy is gendered (Higgins, 1999; Roth, 1999). 
Researchers have found that “certain issues important to women,” 
such as sexual misconduct, “have traditionally been deemed pri-
vate” (Goldfarb, 2000, p. 1), and judicial procedures involving 
these issues are seen more as individual issues than societal issues 
(MacKinnon, 1991). Gotell (2006) argued that “the discourse of 
privacy has served to mask violence, inequality, and subordina-
tion” (p. 747). While arguments for privacy are seemingly made 
to protect survivors, keeping sexual misconduct cases private 
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perpetuates the victimization of women by not publicly holding 
perpetrators accountable for their actions. 
The case of University of Kentucky vs. The Kentucky Kernel 
exemplifies these challenges as critics attacked the institution over 
its lack of transparency and alleged that its misplaced priorities 
endangered students. We apply stakeholder theory and the ethics 
of justice and care to extend our knowledge of crisis communi-
cation in legal crises broadly and sexual misconduct cases spe-
cifically. Using a robust case study approach (Sellnow, Littlefield, 
et al., 2009), we draw from multiple data points, including inter-
views with decision-makers at the University of Kentucky and the 
Kernel, the University’s official statements, and reports from the 
Kernel and other media sources. By speaking with the decision- 
makers, this study offers a better understanding of how individu-
als make decisions in legal crises (Fitzpatrick & Rubin, 1995), spe-
cifically when addressing issues such as privacy and transparency 
in sexual misconduct cases. 
Literature Review
Crisis Communication in Sexual Misconduct Cases 
Crisis communication scholars have identified five primary 
response strategies in legal crises: denial, excuse, justification, 
concession, and diversion (Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 2007; Huang 
et al., 2005). Huang et al. (2005) placed the strategies on a contin-
uum ranging from defensive, which favors organizational interests 
and includes denial, to accommodative, where organizations show 
concern for victims and invoke concession strategies. Research 
suggests legal practitioners favor defensive strategies, advising cli-
ents to remain silent (Fitzpatrick & Rubin, 1995; Gibson & Padilla, 
1999). Crisis communication scholars emphasize a more accom-
modative stance including openly and honestly communicating, 
along with engaging in corrective action, which could be consid-
ered a concession strategy (Seeger, 2006). The tension between 
legal practice and crisis research recommendations is evident in 
the University of Kentucky sexual misconduct case whereby the 
University claimed it could not be transparent and accommodat-
ing because of its concern for the legal right of survivor privacy.
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Recent research has focused on legal crisis communication in 
sexual misconduct cases on college campuses (Madden, 2018), 
including the Duke University lacrosse (Fortunato, 2008; Jin et al., 
2010; Len-Ríos, 2010) and Penn State football cases (Brown et 
al., 2015; Formentin et al., 2017). Scholars have emphasized the 
importance of identifying “critical stakeholders” during sexual mis-
conduct crises, noting that how these individuals evaluate the uni-
versity’s response impacts the university’s reputation (Fortunato, 
2008). For example, Duke University identified key stakeholder 
groups and adjusted its communication strategies depending on 
the stakeholder group (Jin et al., 2010). However, Duke’s decision 
to refrain from involvement in criminal justice allegations prohib-
ited it from satisfying all of its stakeholders, underscoring the chal-
lenge of balancing stakeholder interests during a crisis (Len-Ríos, 
2010). In order to further explore the tension between legal crisis 
communication and balancing stakeholder interest under the cir-
cumstances of sexual misconduct and harassment cases, this study 
poses the following research question: 
RQ1:  What communication strategies did the University employ 
in response to the crisis, and how did stakeholders respond?
Managing Stakeholder Interests
To understand how the University of Kentucky attempted to bal-
ance stakeholder interests in this case, we turn to stakeholder 
theory, which considers how organizations affect and are affected 
by groups including customers, employees, the media, and the 
government (Freeman, 1984). Crises require the organization 
to work with stakeholders to manage outcomes (Ulmer, 2001). 
Stakeholders can pressure an organization throughout the crisis 
by asking for information, demanding answers, and seeking res-
olution (van der Meer et al., 2017). Crises that produce conflict-
ing stakeholder desires complicate the response process. Len-Ríos 
(2010) contended that universities in particular “must make stra-
tegic decisions regarding prioritizing publics” to meet the needs of 
their “broad array of constituents” (p. 269). 
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A prominent framework introduced to classify stakeholders 
is Mitchell et al.’s (1997) theory of stakeholder salience and iden-
tification, which offered a typology of stakeholders using three 
relational dimensions: urgency, power, and legitimacy. The theory 
posits that the more attributes a stakeholder holds, the more salient 
the stakeholder becomes from a managerial perspective. Urgency 
reflects “the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate 
attention” (Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 867). Power embodies the abil-
ity to convince an organization to do something that it would not 
do otherwise (Alpaslan et al., 2009). Finally, a stakeholder wields 
legitimacy if their actions or claims about the organization are 
“desirable, proper or appropriate” within a social system (Such-
man, 1995, p. 574). As the circumstances surrounding the crisis 
change, so do stakeholders’ needs and salience. 
Other “ethical” approaches to stakeholder management during 
a crisis argue that “the decision to include a stakeholder in cri-
sis preparation and response should not be based solely on that 
stakeholder’s salience” (Alpaslan et al., 2009, p. 43; Xu & Li, 2013). 
Organizations often prioritize certain stakeholders during a cri-
sis, but such action should be taken based on the extent of per-
sonal impact (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). To embrace this “ethical 
approach,” organizations must attend to all affected stakehold-
ers (Ulmer, 2001), prioritize stakeholders based on the situation 
and shift these priorities as the situation evolves (Xu & Li, 2013), 
and make decisions that fairly consider and reflect all stakeholder 
interests (Sandin, 2009; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). 
This study thereby proposes the following question: 
RQ2:  What stakeholder group(s) did the University prioritize?
Ethical Approaches
To balance competing stakeholder interests, an organization 
engages in a decision-making process. But “without an ethical com-
pass to guide its decisions,” an organization may employ strategies 
that violate stakeholder expectations (Tao & Kim, 2017, p. 698), 
straining its stakeholder relationships and jeopardizing its legiti-
macy. Two ethical approaches that outline how an organization can 
respond to stakeholder pressure are the ethics of justice and care. 
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An ethic of justice emerged from social justice theory, which 
argues for individuals to be held to universal laws (Rawls, 1971). 
An ethic of justice requires that an organization treat all stakehold-
ers fairly by making impartial decisions that recognize the inter-
ests of all stakeholders involved in the crisis (Sandin, 2009). The 
organization acts objectively and embraces rationality, scientific 
approaches, and individual rights (Simola, 2003; Tao & Kim, 2017), 
drawing upon arguments grounded in logic and objectivity (Kim 
et al., 2016). However, scholars have also suggested that using uni-
versal rules may not account for nuances in crises, limiting an ethic 
of justice’s applicability in crises (Simola, 2003; Tao & Kim, 2017).
An ethic of care emphasizes nurturing relationships and 
expressing values such as compassion and empathy (Fraustino & 
Kennedy, 2018; Kim et al., 2016; Tao & Kim, 2017). This approach 
entails “concern about how to fulfill conflicting responsibilities to 
different people, as opposed to questions of how to resolve claims 
of conflicting rights among them” (Simola, 2003, p. 354). An ethic 
of care approach was a critical response to the justice approach 
(Simola, 2003; Tao & Kim, 2017). Crafted by Gilligan (1977), 
an ethic of care emerged from a feminist perspective, grounded 
in Gilligan’s research that found women valued contextual and 
relational factors when making moral decisions. Gilligan (1982) 
argued a justice-driven approach is too rigid to account for the 
complexity of moral dilemmas. An ethic of care “considers the 
contextual complexities” of crisis and prioritizes those who have 
been affected (Linsley & Slack, 2013; Simola, 2003, p. 354), imply-
ing an organization should be involved and remain “sensitive and 
responsive to the emotional feelings and needs of publics” (Tao & 
Kim, 2017, p. 693). Considering the different ethical approaches 
to balancing stakeholder interests, especially in the dynamics of a 
crisis, this study poses the following question:
RQ3:  How did the University incorporate an ethic of justice and 
an ethic of care in its crisis responses?
Methods
This study aims to understand how organizational decision- 
makers navigate challenging legal and ethical quandaries while 
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illustrating how stakeholder values can conflict with organiza-
tional obligations. We used a robust case study approach, which 
enables researchers to make claims about a situation using multi-
ple sources of information (Sellnow, Littlefield, et al., 2009). Case 
studies are useful when the research examines a current event 
by allowing “investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics” (Yin, 2009, p. 4) to derive practical implications 
(Patton, 2002). This case examines the crisis communication chal-
lenges faced by the University of Kentucky when its handling of 
a sexual misconduct case generated allegations that it was acting 
irresponsibly.
For data triangulation, we included statements released by the 
University of Kentucky on uknow.uky.edu (n = 7), emails from the 
University president to faculty, staff, and students (n = 3), articles 
published by the Kernel (n = 47) and local newspaper The Herald- 
Leader (n = 32), and articles culled in a Google News search using 
the terms “University of Kentucky,” “Kernel,” and “sexual mis-
conduct” (n = 45). All documents were collected from April 6, 
2016, when the Kernel published its first article, to May 17, 2019, 
when the Appeals Court ruled in favor of the Kernel. After receiv-
ing approval from the Institutional Review Board, we conducted 
face-to-face interviews with four individuals who were involved in 
decision-making processes. These individuals were the unnamed 
member of the University of Kentucky’s legal counsel, who pro-
vided legal advice during the case; Jay Blanton, the executive 
director of public relations and marketing, who handled media 
inquiries on behalf of the University; Marjorie Kirk, the former 
Kernel editor, who wrote many of the stories about the case and 
made decisions about what information to publish; and Chris 
Poore, the former Kernel advisor, who said he offered advice to 
student journalists but allowed them to make the final decisions. 
All participants except legal counsel consented to have their names 
included in the write-up of the study.
We used semi-structured interviews to compare answers across 
the sample, adjusted questions based on the interviewers’ affilia-
tion (the University or the Kernel), and asked follow-up questions 
(Patton, 2002). Questions for participants from the Kernel focused 
on the staff ’s concern with the University’s public response, how 
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it expressed these concerns to administration, and the challenges 
the staff faces in covering sexual misconduct cases. Questions for 
University decision-makers centered on the factors that influ-
enced the University’s public response to the case, the challenges 
the University faced when communicating about these types of 
cases, and how maintaining the University’s reputation factored 
into these decisions. Interviews ranged from 41 to 98 minutes and 
were audio-recorded with permission from the participants. 
After collecting data and transcribing the interviews, we con-
ducted textual analysis (Creswell, 2013). First, all data were read 
to achieve a holistic understanding of the case while making ini-
tial notes and observations. Second, the data were re-read multiple 
times to form preliminary codes, which were grouped and placed 
into larger categories or themes, combining codes as needed to 
avoid duplication. Finally, a reading of the data was conducted to 
ensure all evidence supported its assigned theme. The resulting 
analysis is described next.
Case Background
In February 2016, a University of Kentucky professor signed a res-
ignation agreement following a sexual misconduct investigation 
comprising three allegations, two complainants, and five survivors. 
The case (Table 1) began when a spokesperson representing two 
female survivors approached then-Kernel reporter Marjorie Kirk 
(Kirk, personal communication). At first, the paper could only 
report on the settlement statement shared by the University, which 
refused to release the full report (legal counsel, personal commu-
nication), claiming it would “constitute an unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy” (Smith, 2016, para. 5). Revoking tenure can 
take years. The University’s push for resignation offered a quick 
solution, but once the accused leaves the university, the inquiry 
essentially ends (Kirk, 2016b). Because many settlements pro-
hibit disclosing the incident to future employers, the “passing the 
trash” practice permits faculty to move without public knowledge 
of accusations (Rexroat, 2017). The survivors feared the professor 
would repeat the behavior at another institution (Kirk, personal 
communication). 
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TABLE 1 Timeline of Events
February 2016 Accused professor signs an agreement with the 
University of Kentucky (Smith, 2016).
March 2016 Two survivors approach Kirk regarding their 
concerns with the settlement (Westerman, 2017).
April 2016 The Kernel publishes its first article on the case and 
asks the University for records pertaining to the 
case (Kirk & Wright, 2016).
The University provides a letter of the investigation.
The Kernel files an appeal with the Attorney 
General’s office to release the documents (Smith, 
2016).
August 6, 2016 The Attorney General rules the University should 
release the documents but redact the names and 
identifiers of the complainants and witnesses (News 
Staff, 2016).
August 8, 2016 The University announces its decision to sue the 
Kernel as part of the appeals process (Kirk & Wright, 
2016).
August 13, 2016 The Kernel obtains 122 pages of records from a 
confidential source representing the two survivors 
(Kaufman, 2016).
The University confirms its decision to proceed with 
the lawsuit.
August 31, 2016 The University files suit against the Kernel.
September 10, 2016 University of Kentucky President Eli Capilouto 
claims the Kernel publishes “salacious details to 
attract readers” (Blackford, 2016b, para. 12).
September 17, 2016 Journalism faculty ask Capilouto to apologize to 
Kirk over his “salacious” comment and drop the suit 
(Stripling, 2016).
October 2016 The Kernel wins The Pacemaker Award (Blackford, 
2016b).
November 2016 Two survivors “switched their stance” and joined suit 
with the University (Blackford, 2016d).
January 2017 Circuit court judge rules in favor of the University in 
lawsuit, claiming the organization does not have to 
hand over records to the Kernel (Blackford, 2017).
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Early media coverage was impeded by the University’s deci-
sion to only provide the settlement statement, reportedly frustrat-
ing two survivors (Kirk, personal communication). Kirk and the 
then-editor of the Kernel filed an open records request with the 
Attorney General (Kirk & Wright, 2016), who ruled the University 
should release the documents to the Kernel and the Attorney Gen-
eral’s office but redact the names and identifiers of complainants 
and witnesses (News Staff, 2016). The University declined and, in 
accordance with state law, announced it would sue the paper to 
appeal the decision, leading the two survivors to give several pages 
of redacted records to the Kernel (Kirk, personal communication). 
Kirk warned the survivors that “this story’s probably going to take 
off,” anticipating the local newspaper would be interested but not 
that it would quickly gain national attention (personal communi-
cation).
Findings
RQ1: University Response and Stakeholder Reactions 
Secrets “stain” the university’s image. The University applied the 
excuse strategy by using provocation, presenting its actions as the 
appropriate legal response (Huang et al., 2005). Following an alle-
gation, the University must investigate. If the investigation reveals 
an incident did occur, the University initiates a three-step process: 
stop the activity, mitigate the effects, and ensure it never happens 
again “on our campus” (legal counsel, personal communication). 
August 2017 Circuit court judge upheld the previous ruling from 
January (Blackford, 2017).
June 2018 President Capilouto announces that the University 
finalized all changes for disciplinary processes for 
allegations including sexual assault (“UK updates 
policy,” 2018). 
May 2019 Court of Appeals rules that the University violated 
the state’s Open Record Act, sides with Kernel 
(Cheves, 2019).
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The University must provide due process and can only remove the 
accused (legal counsel, personal communication). According to 
University spokesperson Jay Blanton, settling was the fastest way 
to legally remove the threat, even if it “was imperfect” (personal 
communication). The University also sued the Kernel to avoid 
releasing the redacted documents, which it said contained enough 
information to identify the complainants and witnesses. Blanton 
recognized the courts were necessary to reconcile the competing 
tensions of transparency and privacy (personal communication), 
and University legal counsel added that “naming the Kernel is a 
quirk of Kentucky law. Our dispute is with the Attorney General” 
(personal communication). 
The case gained national media attention (Kaufman, 2016), 
even though the University’s decision to sue is a common practice 
between journalists and public institutions according to Kernel 
advisor Chris Poore (personal communication). Some stakehold-
ers supported the University, including on-campus survivors’ 
advocacy group SPARC, which argued that transparency should 
not jeopardize survivors’ “privacy and dignity” (Melanson, 2016, 
para. 22). But conveying the legalities of the situation proved prob-
lematic as the University’s proclaimed desire to protect individuals 
was overshadowed by claims that it “is fighting for secrecy, not for 
privacy. It is fighting for itself, not for victims” (Editorial Board, 
2016b, para. 32). 
A local journalist claimed nearly all the media attention was 
critical (Blackford, 2016d). The Kernel called the case “a stain on 
the University’s image” (Editorial Board, 2016a, para. 20), and 
external agencies deemed it “embarrassing” (Merlan, 2016, para. 
2). The Kernel accused the University of hiding information (Edi-
torial Board, 2016a) and safeguarding its own image (Editorial 
Board, 2016b). Reporters highlighted the University’s status as 
a public institution, contending this position made its behavior 
more egregious (News Staff, 2016). This veil of secrecy was fed by 
what Poore labeled “the Blanton funnel” (personal communica-
tion). Poore expounded that “You only have one source for a story 
on campus. That’s Jay Blanton,” which often produces a “washed 
out” rather than “accurate version of the story.” Kirk added that for 
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the majority of the case, only Blanton’s office would speak with the 
Kernel, which she felt made it appear as though the University was 
“responding to a public image concern, not an administrative or a 
disciplinary concern” (personal communication). 
Following legal precedent or hiding behind the law? The Uni-
versity attempted to act with good intentions by citing the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). Because the Uni-
versity receives federal funds, it must adhere to the federal law, 
which “precludes us from revealing educational records without 
the consent of everyone involved” and broadly defines an edu-
cational record “as essentially any document maintained by the 
University that relates to a student” (legal counsel, personal com-
munication). According to legal counsel, the law required the Uni-
versity to retain all records, even if redacted. The ability to access 
information online also influenced the University’s decision as 
administration determined it was “effectively impossible” to redact 
all identifying details (legal counsel, personal communication) 
and feared the justice system could not guarantee confidentiality 
to prevent retaliation (Westerman, 2017). University legal counsel 
emphasized it acted “with guidance from the U.S. Department of 
Education in 2006,” which stated “you cannot turn over FERPA 
protected documents to a State Attorney General in the context of 
an open records dispute” (personal communication). Legal coun-
sel added that the University provided a description of the docu-
ments to the Attorney General. 
Citing FERPA added a new tension. Critics stated the Univer-
sity overstepped its bounds as the decision about what documents 
can be released “is the job of the legal system, not the University 
President” (Editorial Board, 2016b, para. 23). Others argued the 
use of FERPA made the University the “latest example of colleges 
hiding behind student privacy laws to protect their image and rep-
utation” (New, 2017, para. 3). Both Kirk and Poore claimed other 
universities provided documents in similar cases and were not 
punished (personal communication). 
Blanton and the legal counsel were “disappointed” that media 
coverage never noted the complexity of the University’s decision 
as “there never seemed to be an acknowledgment that the Uni-
versity wasn’t just making this up. We were, in effect, following 
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well-established law” (legal counsel, personal communication). 
Blanton also claimed the media failed to recognize the Univer-
sity’s precarious situation by including “scant” mention of the 
legal-privacy tension and disproportionately focusing on the open 
records debate (personal communication). Conversely, the Ker-
nel frequently questioned why administrators would not release a 
redacted report as a form of compromise (Editorial Board, 2016a; 
Kirk, 2016a). Kirk claimed names and event descriptions are 
unnecessary as “you would just need to know that [the professor] 
was found responsible by his employers for doing this, this, and 
this . . . That page has nothing on it that you could even argue was 
an education record” (personal communication). 
The university’s redaction blunder. The survivors later changed 
their stance and sided with the University as the case gained 
national attention, believing that “the line between the laudable 
goal of transparency and the blatant invasion of privacy has been 
crossed” (Blackford, 2016d, para. 3). But this turn of events was 
overshadowed by a University gaffe. At its Board of Trustees meet-
ing, the University distributed letters written by the survivors 
expressing their “dissatisfaction” with the media coverage, but 
when removing identifying information, overlooked one reference 
that identified a survivor (legal counsel, personal communication). 
Kirk, who attended the meeting, caught the mistake and brought it 
to the attention of Blanton (Kirk, personal communication), who 
swiftly collected the letters and later apologized to the survivors 
(Blanton, personal communication). The media capitalized on the 
mishap, emphasizing that “UK is the only one that has identified a 
victim by name” (Editorial Board, 2016b, para. 20). 
Selling salacious news. During the same Board of Trustees 
meeting, President Eli Capilouto escalated criticism when he stated 
that “In printing salacious details to attract readers, they [the Ker-
nel] have effectively identified the victim survivors” (Blackford, 
2016b, para. 12). Blanton explained that Capilouto meant not all 
details need to be included to print the story (personal communi-
cation). Nevertheless, the damage was done, and Capilouto’s use 
of the attacking the accuser strategy backfired. Many saw his com-
ment as a direct attack on Kirk. Even though Capilouto did not 
explicitly name Kirk, she was the paper’s “decision maker” (Kirk, 
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personal communication). For Poore, “UK was fine as they were 
arguing it as a policy issue. When Dr. Capilouto made it about the 
person, he went way too far” (personal communication). 
Journalism faculty at the University penned a letter request-
ing an apology (Stripling, 2016). Capilouto refused, arguing that 
“to have a student newspaper provide so much information in an 
article that anybody in 15 minutes could most likely identify the 
victims of assault” is “a serious matter” (para. 47). Kirk said she 
conferred with the survivors about the details included in the arti-
cles, such as the professor’s behavior at conferences, and received 
their approval (personal communication). Poore explained that 
without those details, the survivors feared that “people wouldn’t 
realize the setting he had done that in” and thus, assertions that 
they could be readily identified “was pretty unfair treatment” of 
Kirk (personal communication).
Corrective action. The University invoked concession by 
announcing systemic changes. Early on, administrators used cor-
rective action by declaring that it would require new faculty mem-
bers to share their sexual misconduct history and offer training to 
graduate students and their mentors (Capilouto, 2016b). The Uni-
versity also introduced a process for reviewing faculty behavior 
following “clear examples of sexual misconduct” (para. 11). Yet, 
thus far, a required training session has only been offered to grad-
uate students and not their faculty advisors. While other steps, 
such as the revised disciplinary process, show commitment to 
addressing University members’ “concerns and suggestions” (“UK 
updates policy,” 2018, para. 2), it must implement all of its plans 
to address the “passing the trash” problem at the university level. 
RQ2: Stakeholder Priorities 
The University publicly identified its salient stakeholders to be 
(1) the survivors, and (2) current students. The University of 
Kentucky maintained its decisions were to protect the survivors’ 
privacy while adhering to legal obligations. Legal counsel empha-
sized the Kernel provided details, such as “the fact that they were 
Ph.D. students,” noting that the University posts dissertations 
online with advisor names (personal communication). Thus, “If 
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you wanted to look back and see how many students got a Ph.D. 
in a particular field, you could do so in a matter of moments.” The 
University voiced that “truly honoring the value of transparency” 
required letting the survivors make decisions about sharing details 
(Manouchehri, 2016, para. 12).
First, as part of the University’s three-pronged response to 
sexual misconduct (stop, mitigate, prevent), it emphasized that 
its responsibility is to survivors, and that removing the threat to 
protect these stakeholders was paramount (Blanton, personal 
communication; legal counsel, personal communication). Sec-
ond, the administration claimed that protecting survivor privacy 
in this case was necessary to establish a climate where other sur-
vivors would feel safe to report incidents. In an email, Capilouto 
(2017) asserted that “Without privacy, we know victim survivors 
will not come forward to report. That’s what was at stake in this 
case” (para. 3).
Critics maintained that the University was prioritizing itself 
and neglecting “other students and the public” (Kirk, 2016a, para. 
1). The Kernel’s Editorial Board (2016a) offered that the Universi-
ty’s denial of the open records request “showed it cares more about 
its own interests than it cares about the law, accountability or the 
public’s right to information” (para. 13). Critics also claimed that 
the University’s response prioritized the accused over the survi-
vors and other stakeholders. Early on, a spokesperson for the two 
survivors argued:
It feels like UK is trying to protect what went on here and to protect 
[the professor]. Why not have complete transparency in this? . . . UK 
should be interested in protecting not just the students at UK. (UK) 
should also be in the interest of protecting students at other universi-
ties where [the professor] may end up. (Kirk, 2016a, para. 15)
The Editorial Board (2016b) echoed this claim, asserting that “The 
university gives the accused privacy in matters the public has a 
right to know” (para. 10).
RQ3: Ethical Approaches
Several of the University’s decisions and communications reflected 
an ethic of justice by underscoring fairness, protecting rights of 
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all involved parties, and employing legal reasoning. First, Blanton 
emphasized that individuals have a right to due process and recog-
nized that the University has a responsibility to create fairness for 
the accuser and accused (personal communication). Second, the 
University relied on logical reasoning by citing laws, reflecting an 
attempt to objectively evaluate a conflict. Although the University 
cited FERPA to justify not releasing the records, legal counsel also 
explained that “in the sixth circuit, the constitutional right to pri-
vacy extends to the details of a sexual misconduct except where 
the disclosure of those details is necessary for a criminal prosecu-
tion” (personal communication). Thus, “FERPA aside, if instead 
of students, these were departmental secretaries or non-students 
who were alleging sexual misconduct, we could not as a govern-
mental entity turn that information over.”
Although the University tried to determine what the law 
required, Blanton explained that legal codes are “not always 100% 
clear. Judgments have to be made” (personal communication). 
When making the judgment call, the University “landed on the 
side of the victims’ rights to tell their story,” including when and 
how (personal communication), permitting it to employ an ethic 
of care approach by maintaining that its response was an effort to 
do what was right for the survivors. Blanton emphasized that these 
decisions were based on the survivors’ needs, claiming the Uni-
versity “cannot—and should not—decide when it is appropriate to 
violate a victim-survivor’s privacy—and a victim-survivor’s trust—
by providing information to the Office of the Attorney General, the 
Kernel, or any other entity” (Blackford, 2016a, para. 11).
President Capilouto (2016a) underscored relational aspects 
when he asserted that “we believe strongly in the need to protect 
the privacy of members of our community: our students, patients, 
faculty, and staff ” (para. 3). During the Board of Trustees meeting, 
he maintained that the University was trying to remain sensitive to 
the needs of the survivors and support them: 
It is essential that the victim survivors of sexual misconduct know 
that their University stands with them, embracing them when they 
come forward in the courageous effort at justice and at healing; and 
that we will do everything in our power to protect their privacy. . . . 
(Melanson, 2016, para. 17) 
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Capilouto (2016a) also claimed that the University ponders the 
needs of affected stakeholders. He expounded that the University 
annually receives hundreds of open records requests and complies 
with most, but makes circumstantial decisions when deciding 
between transparency or protecting “the privacy and dignity of 
individual members of our community” (para. 7). 
Discussion and Implications
Madden (2018) claimed university-led discussions about sex-
ual misconduct “call into question who is being valued and why” 
and added that “it could become problematic if protecting the 
institution and institutional values supersedes the protection of 
individuals” (p. 305). This statement captures the essence of the 
University of Kentucky case as the administration maintained that 
its priorities lay with protecting the privacy of the survivors while 
many of its stakeholders, including the Kernel, argued that it was 
pursuing self-interest and secrecy. Using stakeholder theory and 
ethical approaches, we explore the theoretical applications in this 
case before describing the larger social implications and offering 
suggestions for practice. 
Theoretical Applications
A stakeholder approach. Power, legitimacy, and urgency were 
crucial to the case’s evolution (Mitchell et al., 1997). Although the 
two survivors reported the professor, leading to his resignation, 
no further action occurred at the University level. After publish-
ing a handful of articles and filing the open records request, the 
Kernel gained a foothold. Shortly thereafter, the alliance of the 
Kernel and two survivors, followed by the newsworthy aspect of 
the University’s decision to sue the Kernel, shifted the balance 
of power in the favor of the Kernel. Further, the Kernel claimed 
its access to the documents, thanks to the survivors, meant the 
University’s message “of fighting for the privacy of its victims” fell 
apart (Editorial Board, 2016a, para. 20), lending legitimacy to the 
paper’s request. The amount of attention given to the case and 
stakeholder pressure on the University added a degree of urgency, 
pushing it to announce changes to minimize the risk of sexual 
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misconduct on campus in September 2016. Although Blanton said 
the adjustments were already under review (Horsley, 2016), Kirk 
(2016c) claimed the step came “only after the university felt pres-
sure and criticism” (para. 16) from stakeholders. 
External media narratives reflected sentiments expressed by 
the Kernel, seemingly delegitimizing the University’s stance as 
reporters criticized the validity of the legal arguments, portraying 
them as “a smokescreen” (New, 2017, para. 14). Some stakeholders 
doubted the legitimacy of the institution itself by raising questions 
about its values, arguing its actions were irresponsible and tried 
“to block sexual assault reporting” (Higdon, 2016, para. 1). Legal 
rulings throughout the case also shifted the tide of legitimacy 
arguments. In 2017, the University received support when the cir-
cuit court ruled in its favor, prompting a sizable decline in external 
media coverage. The survivors’ decision to join the University in 
the lawsuit after the case received substantial publicity, expressing 
concern that disclosing additional records would allow the media 
or others to uncover their identities (Blackford, 2016d), and also 
altered the trajectory as those who were the most directly affected 
by the University’s decisions now stood with it. 
Although the Kernel’s persistence in pressuring the Univer-
sity to release the information made it, along with others, a salient 
stakeholder, the University refused to budge and relied on an eth-
ical stakeholder argument (Xu & Li, 2013). The administration 
fervently maintained that its efforts were to protect those most 
affected by the crisis, the survivors, from the onset when the Uni-
versity removed the accused. The University had to operate within 
legal parameters that required some details to be withheld while 
responding to public pressure to release information. The situa-
tion created a legal-ethical tension since releasing information 
would place the survivors at risk and, according to the University, 
violate federal law. However, withholding the information could 
endanger other individuals and violate the Open Records Act. The 
University’s unwillingness to release certain documents out of a 
proclaimed interest to protect the survivors hindered it from tak-
ing action that reflected the interests of all stakeholders (Sandin, 
2009; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). The University maintained that 
it had a legal obligation and a “moral responsibility” to protect 
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survivors (Kaufman, 2016, para. 20), but one reporter countered 
that it had “a moral and ethical obligation, presumably, to inform 
people when a faculty member who might be hired elsewhere 
has been accused of something as egregious as this” (Stripling, 
2016, para. 33). By withholding the documents, the administra-
tion alienated select stakeholders, including the Kernel, some stu-
dents and faculty, the Attorney General, external media outlets, 
and early on, two female survivors. Unable to shield the survivors, 
empower third parties to expose the alleged wrongdoing of the 
accused, and operate within legal confines, the University simply 
could not reconcile all stakeholder interests.
Ethical approaches. The University tried to embrace an ethic 
of justice in emphasizing its compliance with the legal system. By 
adhering to a universal standard, the University attempted to appear 
objective and fair. However, an ethic of justice requires impartial-
ity (Sandin, 2009), and the University also openly claimed to pri-
oritize the survivors and current students over other stakeholders. 
A key component of an ethic of justice is the ability to resolve con-
flicting rights (Simola, 2003), which created a double-bind for the 
University as the two values in question were the survivors’ right 
to privacy and the public’s right to know. Favoring one came at the 
expense of the other, and the situational constraints made it infea-
sible for the University to employ an ethic of justice. 
The University’s announcement to prioritize those who it 
perceived to be most affected by the crisis, survivors and current 
students, reflected an ethic of care, which accounts for caveats by 
recognizing the “particular circumstances of individuals” (Xu & 
Li, 2013, p. 382) and acknowledges that organizations may not be 
able to resolve stakeholder conflicts (Simola, 2003). By adopting an 
ethic of care, the University should have been able to address each 
stakeholder group in accordance with its own needs, permitting it 
to thoughtfully explain its stance and underscore its value for all 
stakeholders. The University adhered to an ethic of care by noting 
the situational complexities and vocalizing support for survivor 
privacy. However, its use of legal reasoning to defend its position 
and the administration’s openly discordant relationship with the 
Kernel often left it appearing detached rather than “sensitive and 
responsive” to all stakeholders (Tao & Kim, 2017, p. 693). This 
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approach fostered a public perception that these stakeholders did 
not matter to the University (Editorial Board, 2016c), hindering 
it from fulfilling conflicting stakeholder responsibilities (Simola, 
2003), and crippling the effectiveness of its crisis response. 
Critical Applications
A larger implication of this study reflects the University’s reli-
ance on the value of privacy to protect the survivors, ultimately 
illustrating the concerns advanced by feminist legal scholars who 
warn that a privacy approach can overshadow the greater issue 
at hand (Higgins, 1999; Roth, 1999). Gotell (2006) advanced that 
constructing a privacy argument on behalf of complainants cre-
ates a paradox as the “public/private divide” can be “deployed 
to shield sexual violence from public view” (p. 746). Gotell also 
offered that privacy appeals can nurture a systemic problem as this 
argument perpetuates the idea that sexual misconduct is a pri-
vate matter, allowing it to “become individualized and contained 
in a moment” (p. 747). Although the case did bring attention to 
the systemic shortcoming of “passing the trash” in academia, 
this concern was quickly buried by an avalanche of coverage on 
the open records debate and lawsuit. The extensive focus on the 
privacy-transparency tension prohibited the University and 
media outlets from fully illustrating the complexities of the case 
and discussing the problems inherent in the justice system and 
higher education, which was the crux of the survivors’ decision to 
pursue the issue in a public forum in the first place.
Additionally, this case study reflects the fluid dynamics between 
media coverage and victim reporting in sexual assault/misconduct 
cases. In October 2016, the University claimed that the number of 
individuals reporting sexual assault dropped from 59 reports to 38 
since the beginning of the case, which it attributed to the extensive 
media coverage (Blackford, 2016c). While we do not know that the 
media coverage was the catalyst in the reduced number of reports, 
this case offers warnings about the effects of extensive coverage 
of sexual harassment and assault cases. When the complainants 
went to the University’s Title IX office, confidentiality was their 
key concern, and one survivor emphasized she wanted to avoid the 
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courts to protect her identity because of her career (Westerman, 
2017). However, the survivors’ decision to side with the University 
as news coverage escalated out of fear that their identities would 
be revealed demonstrates the potential costs that survivors may 
encounter when they report these crimes. It also suggests that the 
substantial attention given to these cases could discourage others 
from reporting and preserve a culture of silence. 
Practical Implications
This study offers six practical implications for legal crises, and 
specifically, sexual misconduct and harassment crises. First, legal 
and public relations practitioners should establish relationships 
before crises. Blanton recommended practitioners be “at the table” 
when decisions are made or they will “be behind” (personal com-
munication). He added that the President’s office, legal counsel, 
and public relations team were all involved in drafting messages, 
underscoring the need to form an interdepartmental crisis man-
agement team and coordinate response efforts (Coombs, 2019; 
Seeger et al., 2003). 
Second, organizations must maintain a respectful relation-
ship with the media. The administration and the Kernel publicly 
disagreed and made scathing comments. Yet, Kirk and Blanton 
shared that they respected each other (personal communication). 
Kirk and Poore also noted that the University never attempted to 
influence the Kernel’s coverage (personal communication). Poore 
added that the University gave the paper a “courteous heads up” 
before filing the lawsuit and explained that he and Blanton con-
versed “behind the scenes, trying to solve problems if they were 
solvable” (personal communication). 
Third, even if organizations cannot supply all details, grant-
ing media access to relevant parties, including important actors, 
is essential. The University’s reliance on the “Blanton funnel” sup-
ported claims in this case that the institution was not being trans-
parent. Some crisis scholars recommend that organizations use 
multiple individuals to disseminate a message (Sellnow, Ulmer, 
et al., 2009). Issues such as sexual misconduct are complex and 
sensitive, and a public relations practitioner may not be the best 
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individual to relay messages. The University should have enabled 
others to discuss the case, including legal counsel, Title IX offi-
cers, members of its Violence Intervention and Prevention Center, 
and other administrators. A chorus of voices highlighting differ-
ent components and delivering more empathetic statements, while 
maintaining a consistent narrative, can lend more authenticity and 
credibility.
Fourth, organizations must explain situational challenges of 
complex legal issues. Legal counsel claimed that the University 
attempted to share its legal position in a way that the general public 
“would readily understand and appreciate” (personal communica-
tion). However, Blanton admitted that the University “struggled” 
to share its perspective (personal communication). The Univer-
sity released only seven public statements compared to the Kernel’s 
47 articles. Blanton noted the University became more proactive 
as the case escalated because “other people are going to tell your 
story . . . it’s always better to take the shot first” (personal commu-
nication).
Fifth, even though an organization may not be able to pacify all 
stakeholders, it should embrace an ethic of care in its responses by 
recognizing all concerns. The University’s heavy use of the justifi-
cation and excuse strategies, along with its reliance on legal reason-
ing, impeded it from acknowledging stakeholders who questioned 
its actions. Fraustino and Kennedy (2018) proposed that orga-
nizations should “communicate with these publics from a stance 
of care,” particularly when dealing with “vulnerable populations” 
(p. 25). An organization should acknowledge and respectfully 
engage with all publics, but it may need to prioritize certain stake-
holders, such as survivors, during these situations. 
Finally, this study advocates for journalists to thoughtfully 
cover these cases, underscoring the importance of trauma- 
informed reporting (Gearing, 2019). Kirk explained sensitivity 
was “the hardest part” as “I had to make sure I was not going to 
cause harm that I could not justify” (personal communication). 
For the news media to play its significant role in bringing these 
issues to light, news agencies should cultivate a reputation that 
ensures survivors are comfortable approaching the outlet because 
they know their dignity will be maintained. 
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Conclusion
The Kernel and its staff earned national recognition for their 
reporting. The Kernel received “The Pacemaker” award, known as 
the “Pulitzer Prize of collegiate journalism,” from the Associated 
Collegiate Press (Nederhoed, 2016) and the College Press “Freedom 
Award” from the Student Press Law Center (SPLC, 2017). Glamour 
magazine recognized Kirk as one of its ten “College Women of 
the Year” (Harder, 2017). Despite these accolades, in August 2017, 
the circuit court sided with the University, ruling the Attorney 
General does not have the authority to examine documents if they 
are protected under FERPA (Blackford, 2017). In May 2019, the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals overturned that decision. Judge Kelly 
Thompson, who wrote the three-judge panel’s majority opinion, 
stated the University “has taken the indefensible position that the 
records are exempt because it says they are and it must be believed” 
and requested the University review all documents to identify 
those which are not exempt under privacy rule (Associated Press 
[AP], 2019, para. 5). The University must then release documents 
that can be safely redacted, and explain why withheld documents 
are exempt under law (Cheves, 2019). 
As stakeholders demand transparency, organizational 
decision-makers must identify how to balance information provi-
sion and privacy. In the University of Kentucky’s sexual miscon-
duct case, the privacy-transparency tension placed administrators 
in a precarious position. By protecting survivor privacy, the Uni-
versity seemingly put other stakeholders at risk, provoking an out-
cry that the institution favored its reputation over transparency. 
This study describes the challenges organizations face when bal-
ancing stakeholder interests because of legal restraints or because 
interests are irreconcilable. Despite demands for an organization 
to be open, this study demonstrates how prioritizing stakeholders 
can limit an organization’s ability to be forthcoming, particularly 
when the story the public is interested in is not the organization’s 
story to tell. 
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